

Appendix C

Selected Articles on Maneuver Warfare Tactics

The articles of this appendix are included to help educate you in maneuver warfare tactics. You are **not** responsible for these articles on the final exam.

The U.S. Army adopted AirLand battle as its warfighting doctrine in 1982. AirLand battle is very similar to maneuver warfare.

Article	Page
<i>Tactics and Theory</i> , by John C. Scharfen, (<i>Amphibious Warfare Review</i> , July, 1984), Reproduced courtesy of <i>Amphibious Warfare Review Magazine</i> .	C-1
<i>Tactics in Maneuver Warfare</i> , by William S. Lind, (<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , September, 1981), Reproduced courtesy of <i>Marine Corps Gazette Magazine</i> .	C-7
<i>The Criticality of Time in Combat</i> , by General James H. Polk, (<i>Armor</i> , May-June 1988), Reproduced courtesy of <i>Armor Magazine</i> .	C-11
<i>The Commander's Intent</i> , by Captain Thomas M. Jordan, (<i>Infantry</i> , May-June, 1988), Reproduced courtesy <i>Infantry Magazine</i> .	C-15
<i>Command, Control, and the Commander's Intent</i> , by Major Edward J. Filiberti, (<i>Military Review</i> , August, 1987), Reproduced courtesy <i>Military Review Magazine</i> .	C-17
<i>The Commander's Intent: Keep it Short</i> , by Major Russell W. Glenn, (<i>Military Review</i> , August, 1987), Reproduced courtesy <i>Military Review Magazine</i> .	C-23

Tactics and Theory

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY, JR. USMC

by John C. Scharfen

SCHARFEN: General Gray, while others have theorized about the concepts and principles of maneuver warfare, you have been one of the few proponents who have had the opportunity to exercise the theory in practice. Could you put the role of the Division's initiatives on this form of warfare in the context of the overall II MAF operations program?

GRAY: Certainly. Your question lets me put our Second Marine Division role into proper perspective. First, our maneuver warfare initiatives have not been taken in isolation of the other components of the II MAF. As a matter of fact, it has been a coordinated effort with the Second Marine Air Wing, the Second Force Service Support Group and the Headquarters of II MAF. When we embarked on this program, we had the concurrence and support of the commanders of each of those major Fleet Marine Force Atlantic commands.

Your question also gives me the opportunity right at the outset of our discussion to make another important point. While, by virtue of the privilege I have of commanding this Division, I am, as you put it, in a position to exercise the theory in practice, I am not the only Marine doing so and I am far from the first.

As we discuss the basics of maneuver warfare, it won't be hard to recognize that it is a style that many Marines have

employed over the years and that it has been at the conceptual core of some of our most successful amphibious operations. Inchon comes to mind immediately. The World War II Pacific Island campaigns offer other examples. In operations not launched from the sea, General Barrow's A Shau Valley operation in Vietnam is a good example. There are dozens of American precedents with one of the classics being Jackson's Valley Campaign.

I would also like to mention that the other divisions, wings and service support groups also have undertaken some very worthwhile initiatives that are compatible to the maneuver warfare style of combat.

SCHARFEN: Do you agree with Mr. Lind's definition of maneuver warfare—and I am going to paraphrase some of his thoughts here—that it is a style of warfare that is opposed to the fire-power attrition model that seeks to destroy the capability of the enemy to wage war as opposed to relying exclusively on the destruction of his forces?'

GRAY: Yes, I guess I agree with that definition, but I would like to embellish it a bit. I must say I don't think that it goes far enough. I know Mr. Lind would agree that the concept of maneuver war is as much a state of mind as it is a theory. It emphasizes the importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative which General Trainor (our Marine Corps' Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Operations) has espoused as a foundation to his new "thoughts on war."² It is a style that encourages you to anticipate the enemy through what I might call the four "D's"; disorientation, disruption, dislocation and finally destruction of his cohesion. All this is accomplished with



Major General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., USMC

Major General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., is the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Born June 22, 1928, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in April 1952.

Promoted to brigadier general in 1976, he presided over a special study group on the Marine Corps Reserve and then was assigned duties as Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command, Atlantic, and Commanding General, 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade.

General Gray was selected for promotion to his current rank of major general in January 1980.

of Maneuver Warfare

unrelenting and increasing pressure against his vital points. It emphasizes the offensive. It implies the exercise of the initiative at the small unit. It capitalizes upon the unanticipated through the recon-pull approach rather than that of the planner-push. It is a concept that is more psychological than physical. It is the indirect rather than the direct approach to conflict.

SCHARFEN: Does the term maneuver warfare really describe all that?

GRAY: I'm not certain that it is the proper title. The term carries with it a lot of questionable baggage. To many it implies a heavy reliance on mechanization, to others it connotes an exclusively ground oriented concept. Neither inference is correct. Maneuver warfare has applications across the spectrum of war from air to surface, from tactics to strategy, from operations to logistics. I'm afraid that the title has generated some semantic confusion and excessive debate over definition of terms.

SCHARFEN: How does the concept relate to maneuver?

GRAY: First, let me say something about maneuver. Maneuver in warfare must be purposeful. Since maneuver expends the resources of your force, it must be productive. We must be careful that we don't inculcate into a generation of junior officers the philosophy that maneuver is intrinsically desirable. You must achieve something with the expenditure of your valuable resources.

Now to answer your question. If you are going to apply unrelenting pressure against your enemy to disorient him and destroy his cohesion, you must find and hit him at his vital points. Movement in maneuver warfare also implies that you are consistently placing the enemy at a disadvantage in space and time, both in fact and in his and your perceptions.

SCHARFEN: As you have pointed out, the principles of maneuver warfare are not new. Nevertheless, it has become a very important topic of discussion in the Marine Corps within the past three or four years. It is a regular topic addressed in the *Marine Corps Gazette* and even has been the subject of Marine Corps Schools' publications. What has prompted this interest in the concept?

Colonel John C. Scharfen, USMC (Ret.), is no newcomer to military journalism. He has had over 35 articles and studies published in the Amphibious Warfare Review, Washington Times, Marine Corps Gazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Military Review, Baltimore Sun, RUSI Journal and with Stanford Research Institute. After retiring from the Marine Corps in 1973, Colonel Scharfen worked for Stanford Research for eight years before moving to his current position as Senior Analyst for TITAN Systems, Inc., a California based systems engineering firm. While on active duty, Colonel Scharfen was a General War Planner CINC-EUR, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3) Third Marine Division and Deputy Director of Joint Planning Group, HQMC. A graduate of Stanford University (B.A.) and Georgetown University (M.S. International Affairs), Colonel Scharfen has completed additional graduate work in Russian, communications, business administration and systems management.

GRAY: Of course, the debate has not been limited to Marine Corps publications, but you are right, it has generated a great deal of Marine Corps interest.

On its own merit, I believe that maneuver warfare is a superior way to fight. But I don't think that this fact alone can account for the interest that has been generated in this approach. It appears to me that the genesis of the interest is the recognition



We must be more concerned about how we get the most out of our communications, but we also must be concerned about how we can live without them. I think we need to do more on silent landings, day and night, surface and air.

of the fact that the potential enemy in a major war is likely to have superior raw combat power to pit against U.S. forces, and particularly against a deployed MAGTF. You don't defeat such a force by relying primarily on fire power, frontal assault and attrition. Rather, you defeat him by superior technology, maintaining the initiative with intelligent, purposeful movement, by attacking his most vulnerable points and through the application of firepower. Such is the essence of maneuver warfare. Maneuver warfare is being accepted as a valid concept for the training and organization of MAGTF's because we have a requirement to fight this kind of war, not because it is a fixation of the military intellectual.

SCHARFEN: General; with that background, can we discuss maneuver warfare in the 2d Marine Division? Specifically, how does the concept impact on how you train and equip for the employment of your forces?

GRAY: Let's start with training. Before the Second Marine Division, or any military organization can capitalize on maneuver warfare, everyone in the organization must be reading off the same OpOrder. There must be a common approach to the details of tactics. I think that we would have one hell of a mess if we had one maneuver element working on mission type orders, operating with a great deal of aggressive independence, moving out to capitalize on the unexpected with another, supporting element, operating in a more conventional, conservative mode. The commander of the two elements would be faced with a situation not unlike having a team of horses hitched up to a trace with one going at near maximum speed while the other was going a great deal slower. The result would be a series of great circles. So we spend a lot of time indoctrinating our officers and men in the dynamics of the battlefield to insure that we all have the same mindset—that they know

Warfare

Continued

what to expect of me and my staff and what I expect of them.

Above all else we try to orient our training upon the cultivation of the attitude that the only thing certain on the battlefield will be the uncertain—the unexpected. We train them to expect to find no recipes or formulas which will guarantee success in battle. We should think of good training not just as a prerequisite to the conduct of maneuver warfare, but as the essential ingredient to winning.



We insist that every Marine know the mission and the intent of the commander two echelons above his own.

SCHARFEN: Other than the basics of good leadership, audacity, innovative concepts, delegation, what are some of the military skills you believe are fundamental to maneuver warfare that require emphasis here in the Division?

GRAY: There is a litany of them that I touch on every time I address the Marines of this Division and anywhere else where I speak on professionalism. Included is the requirement to exploit both strategic and tactical mobility. Flexible logistics are fundamental. We need to do a lot of work on NBC. Recent combat operations in the Middle East demonstrate the importance of air defense and the suppression of air defenses. If you are going to preempt the enemy with your audacity and initiative, you must have good intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to provide the kind of target acquisition that is fundamental to such operations. Deception can be a good force multiplier as we demonstrated in our World War II amphibious operations at Tinian and elsewhere. There isn't any professional who wouldn't put C³ very high in priority in the fundamental skills that are essential for successful operations. There is EW, an art which, because it is generally done behind locked doors, is often ignored to the detriment of the command. Finally, the threat of terrorism deserves our attention

because it can fundamentally change our view of the enemy order of battle, giving him unconventional potentials that could erode our capabilities.

SCHARFEN: How does this training relate to the training and basic skills Marines bring with them to the Division?

GRAY: It builds on them. I want to emphasize that there is nothing we are proposing under this concept that is alien to the fundamental training, operations or administrative routines of the Marine Corps. The training and experience our Marines get in our depots, centers and schools equip them to participate in and contribute to the maneuver warfare objectives of this Division. What we are trying to do is raise them to the next plateau of integrated tactical concepts in this operational environment. What we are doing neither contradicts nor replaces those basic skills Marines bring to this Division from our schools and other operating units. Nor does it conflict with amphibious doctrine.

I will go further to say that at the core of amphibious doctrine are the essentials of maneuver warfare including the elements of strategic and tactical mobility, the element of surprise, stretching the enemy resources for the defense of multiple landing sites, deception and flexible logistics.

Maneuver warfare is being accepted as a valid concept . . . because we have a requirement to fight this kind of war, not because it is a fixation of the military intellectual.

SCHARFEN: I have a list here of the fundamental precepts that I believe you subscribe to in your Division training programs. I would like to cite them one at a time and get your views on their application. First is the commander's intent.

GRAY: We want our Marines to understand what their commanders are trying to accomplish on the battlefield. Knowledge of the commander's intent is an absolute requirement, if the subordinate is going to be given the freedom of action that is implicit in mission-type orders and recon-pull tactics. We insist that every Marine know the mission and the intent of the commander two echelons above his own.

SCHARFEN: And Focus of the Main Effort?

GRAY: As you can see as we discuss these fundamentals, they are by no means independent considerations. As a matter of fact, there is a great deal of interdependence between them. The mutual dependence is demonstrated here. If subordinates are going to know and appreciate the commander's intent, they must have an appreciation for, and complete dedication to, the next senior commanders' focus of the main effort of the operation before they can be given the independence that goes with mission-type orders.

SCHARFEN: And what of the dedication to mission type orders?

GRAY: We try to impress at every level of command that it is important that, to the extent possible, we should tell our subordinate commanders what they must do rather than dwell on the details of how they should do it. We tell them who they must help and who they must support and, finally, with whom they should coordinate. This is the sense of mission type orders. Readers of the *Amphibious Warfare Review* will recognize that it is not a new approach, but it is fundamental to this concept of maneuver war.

SCHARFEN: What special conditions must exist before a commander can rely upon mission type orders?

GRAY: Familiarity with the commander that can only come with experience and mutual confidence. We have been doing everything in our power to enhance this process of understanding by stabilizing personnel in units. Unit stability fosters the growth of unit cohesion, it generates the anticipation of the purpose and intent of the commander and it fosters *esprit*.

SCHARFEN: Recon-pull tactics.

GRAY: We indoctrinate our commanders with the necessity of recon-pull rather than command-push initiatives from subordinate units. Both mission-type orders and recon-pull fundamentals imply that the commander has a great deal of trust in the judgment of his subordinate commanders. This trust requires nourishment and cultivation—it isn't generated overnight. It is only achieved by working together for extended periods in operational environments.

I have some problems with the term "recon-pull" however, in that to many, it focuses narrowly on organic reconnaissance capabilities. "Integrated intelligence pull" may be a better description connoting the influence of the full bag of your intelligence resources.

SCHARFEN: Infiltration tactics?

GRAY: Too often we associate infiltration of the enemy exclusively with small units and with unconventional operations. In maneuver warfare we talk about infiltration as a function of conventional operations and as being within the capability of the larger unit. Infiltration on this scale requires very good command, control and communications to insure that you are properly coordinated.

SCHARFEN: And what do you mean by command forward?

GRAY: Let me start out by telling you what it doesn't mean. It doesn't mean that commanders should become point men for their units. It doesn't mean that commanders can ignore both what is going on in the rear and the requirement for effective

We want our commanders to think. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the innovative.

combat support. It means that the commander must focus upon and give his first priority to the accomplishment of his combat mission, and that requires a command forward philosophy—that is, the commander must be mentally in concert with his units in contact at the front edge of his operating area. Physically, he may be sitting in a bunker or flying overhead in a helicopter, but psychologically he must be with his forward units. I like Sir John Hackett's phrase about the "smell of the battlefield" when describing the commander's appreciation for operations within the combat arena.

SCHARFEN: And finally, a fundamental which, by this time, appears to be self evident; initiative in the absence of orders.


GRAY: Yes, it is certainly a corollary to all the others you have cited. We want our commanders to *think*. Go ahead and make mistakes, but do the innovative, get inside the enemy's mind, think about what his intentions are, how he is going to react and outsmart him with your initiative in the absence of orders from a senior command. We are serious about being committed to giving our Marines the freedom to make mistakes. It is difficult to overcome some fundamental inhibitions we have in this respect, but it is one of our priority concerns.

SCHARFEN: Still on the subject of training for maneuver war, can we transition now to the exercises you may be conducting which incorporate the fundamentals of this style of war?

GRAY: Certainly. We have MAB-level free play exercises twice a year at Fort Pickett that provide plenty of latitude for our Marines to experiment with new tactics and techniques. Each unit that participates gets more than one chance to fight against an unrestrained superior force that is bent on destroying it. We emphasize that units have the freedom to maneuver within very flexible limits. Each problem is followed by a critique which not only addresses the tactics and techniques which were employed, but also the thought that was behind them. We want to know if their scheme of maneuver was well thought out, logical and supportive of the commander's intent. We discuss the question of whether or not the maneuver brings decisive, positive results.

SCHARFEN: Do you have any examples of payoff to your training efforts here in the Second Division?

GRAY: Yes. I was afraid that you weren't going to ask. Our BLT 2/8 conducted classic maneuver warfare operations to achieve some very impressive results on Grenada in October 1983. This was a real "come as you are operation" that demanded the type of independent judgment and initiative without detailed prior planning that is characteristic of what we expect in maneuver war. Right from the start there was need for flexibility



Maneuver warfare must be purposeful. . . . You must achieve something with the expenditure of your valuable resources.

with the knowledge at H-2 on D-Day that the primary landing plan would have to be scrapped and that the Marines would have to go over alternate beaches. This flexibility was further demonstrated once BLT 2/8 was ashore. Defenders were taken by complete surprise by the Marine tanks and amphibious assault vehicles that aggressively moved forward against the defenders. The Marines use of maneuver warfare tactics demoralized the Cubans and the Peoples' Revolutionary Army. One Cuban officer the BLT captured said that he surrendered to the Marines because they kept popping up in the most

Warfare

Continued

unexpected places and he figured further resistance was futile. His comments speak volumes about the psychological impact of well-executed maneuver warfare operations.

SCHARFEN: Is there anything else in the area of training in which you think the readers of the *Amphibious Warfare Review* will be interested?

GRAY: I think that the Maneuver Warfare Board that we have created should be of interest. This Board, chaired by the ADC, Brigadier General Milligan, which is manned by select members of the Division, the Second Force Service Support Group and the Second Marine Air Wing, meets several times a month to consider books and articles which might be chosen for distribution within the Division to stimulate interest in and knowledge of these fundamentals we believe are to be at the heart of conducting effective maneuver war. It fills our need for a professional forum on this subject and helps to institutionalize our training and education objectives.

And, by the way, just to make a parenthetical remark, I think that the controversy that has been generated on the pages of our professional journals like the *Marine Corps Gazette* over the value and feasibility of maneuver war has been one of the healthiest things that could have possibly happened in the evolution of Marine Corps tactical doctrine. It has stimulated some controversy and some potent thought on how we should fight our forces.

The Board also considers how new equipment might enhance our maneuver capabilities. The Board studies the applications of maneuver warfare to amphibious operations and devises map problems for me to use for the training of my



We try to orient our training upon the cultivation of the attitude that the only thing certain on the battlefield will be the uncertain.

commanders and staff. The composition of the board is constantly changing—both a good and a bad thing, but on balance, probably good since more people become involved—as officers and enlisted Marines deploy to the LFTF and WEST-PAC.

SCHARFEN: Could you summarize your Division training objectives in pursuing proficiency in this style of warfare?

GRAY: Yes. We have three objectives in the Division that are the overriding considerations in preparing to fight this style of war. The first is to promote better leadership, the second is

better training and the third is self discipline. Now I know that these three objectives could apply to any tactical concept, but I believe they are the cornerstones of maneuver warfare. In working toward these three objectives it is my intent to institutionalize audacity throughout the hierarchy of the Division. I want the command to know that at all levels that responsible individuals must exercise their initiative, that they be allowed to make mistakes and fail once in a while. You can't instill these qualities in an organization like this without emphasizing leadership, training and self discipline.

SCHARFEN: General, can you be more explicit on how you relate these three objectives to maneuver warfare?

GRAY: Well, let's take better leadership first. Uncertainty is endemic to the battlefield. We can capitalize on uncertainty by developing leaders who view uncertainty as an advantage to be capitalized upon, rather than a disadvantage that inhibits their options. The best way to make capital of uncertainty is through maneuver.

SCHARFEN: And better training?

GRAY: Better training is essential to maneuver warfare because it is more demanding of all elements of the force than the alternatives. In maneuver warfare you must train to use combat information faster than your adversary. You must train to take advantage of the strategic and tactical intelligence resources that are available to you with your area of interest extended out 100 to 200 miles. You must have well exercised, flexible logistic support that is a function of training and organization as much as it is a function of available materiel.

Self discipline implies a mindset or thought process to fight a style of warfare. It implies that you know your basic tactical techniques by rote before you master higher level maneuver tactics. Self discipline means that you have developed your tactical prowess to the point that maneuvering your force to gain a tactical advantage is as much instinctive as it is the result of a commander's estimate.

SCHARFEN: General, can we discuss how the Second Division forces are equipped for maneuver war?

GRAY: I can answer that question very directly. We are equipped as are other divisions in the Marine Corps. We receive no special equipment because of our commitment to this style of war. This doesn't mean that we aren't interested in new technologies. This doesn't mean that we ignore applications to maneuver war in the equipment that is in our tables of allowances that we might overlook if we weren't so disposed. We may use our equipment differently than we would otherwise to gain greater mobility or to capitalize on surprise. I would like to go back to my major premise however, that maneuver warfare isn't so much a function of how you are equipped as it is a function of how you think. We do concentrate on making the maximum use of the tools that are at our disposal rather than waiting for wish-list technologies to solve our problems. Having said that I want to assure you that we do think about and we do plan to incorporate those very promising advances that are on the near horizon such as the LAV and the LCAC which will give us another dimension of maneuver.

SCHARFEN: General, could we now address some arguments that have been made against embracing maneuver warfare as a standard for a Marine Division tactical doctrine? One serious concern that has been cited is that adopting maneuver warfare supports the position of many of the "military reformers" who oppose defense spending as a matter of

Warfare

Continued

principle. The reasoning goes that some members of this group believe that maneuver warfare gives you more combat power for less expenditure of resources and it is therefore a good program for them to embrace to rationalize cuts in the defense budget. Does this concern you?

GRAY: Not enough to diminish my enthusiasm for promoting the concept. It's probably true that you are going to get more combat power at less cost in maneuver warfare because it is a superior way to fight. But the argument that adopting this philosophy justifies defense cuts is going to be very difficult to sustain. I think it lacks credibility and that it won't be taken seriously in responsible quarters.

SCHARFEN: There are those who argue that there is an inconsistency between advancing the technique of mission-type orders and the requirement to have integrated, thoroughly planned logistic support and positive control.

GRAY: Not a bad point and one that every commander who is conscientious about promoting initiative in his subordinates must face. However, it simply is a matter of trade-offs between ideals. Ideally, you would like to give a capable, aggressive subordinate commander complete freedom to develop and exercise his tactical scheme of maneuver. Ideally, you would like to give your logistician a detailed scenario for exactly the way the operation is going to be conducted. Obviously, these two ideals are in conflict, which means that on the one hand you just can't turn commanders loose and let them go at it without any consideration of control and coordination and, on the other hand, you must demand some flexibility from your logistician and your C³ people to insure that they aren't driving the scheme of maneuver.

SCHARFEN: What about the argument that there is an undue reliance upon mechanization of Marine forces by maneuver warfare advocates?

GRAY: I can only say, from my perspective, and what I know of others who want to fight this way, that it simply isn't true that there is an overemphasis on mechanization. Let me go back to my first premise—maneuver warfare is a way of thinking and is independent of the manner in which forces are equipped or where they fight. When we talk about the need for mobility we are talking about relative mobility *vis-a-vis* the enemy. It may be on foot, as well as in a mechanized column. Concepts of maneuver warfare are as relevant in mountain fighting as they are on the open plains. Now, if someone were to tell me that the Second Marine Division was about to be equipped tomorrow with a whole new family of LCACs or a complement of new super fast, lightweight armor vehicles that were impervious to anti-armor systems, I would be a very happy man. I would consider that these new vehicles would greatly enhance our capability to fight a maneuver warfare style operation. However, as desirable as these systems may be, it is not essential that they be organic to this Division to embrace a concept that is based on a thought process and a mental discipline on how to engage an enemy.

SCHARFEN: And what about the complaint that there is nothing new in maneuver warfare and that its proponents are just making a great fuss over something everyone else takes for granted?

GRAY: There is some truth here. The concepts that we embrace in maneuver warfare have been around for a long while. I find interesting something that Bill Lind said in a television interview last April—that there are probably no new ideas on war that have been introduced since the 18th Century. The concepts that we are promoting in the Second Division have been around for centuries and Marines from Generals Harry Lee to Puller to Walt and Barrow all have employed them. However, until now, we in the Marine Corps really haven't dedicated ourselves in a conceptually structured way to codify the specific tactics and techniques which are inherent in this approach to war. And this is the important point to be made. What we are proposing isn't new. What is new is the process of codifying it in our manuals, training for it in our exercises and in our approach to leadership. It's a very significant development within this Division and within the Marine Corps. It has been incorporated into our Long Range Plan and other planning and training documents for future amphibious operations.

SCHARFEN: What are your thoughts on areas that still need development in the evolution of maneuver warfare with Marine operating forces?

GRAY: There are a number. I think the relationship and application of maneuver warfare in a chemical or biological warfare environment is an interesting subject. It seems to me that the tactics and techniques we espouse for maneuver warfare have particular relevance to the tactical nuclear battlefield. It's amazing how little time we really give to preparing to fight a tactical nuclear war. I am concerned about how we increase mobility with our present and scheduled resources by taking advantage of the assets we have and lightening the load of the infantryman. I am particularly concerned about the Marine's load in cold weather operations, such as we have in Norway. Communications are a critical consideration and we must do better in this area. We must be more concerned about how we get the most out of our communications, but we also must be concerned about how we can live without them. I think we need to do more on silent landings, day and night, surface and air. Why can't we do silent airstrikes? The problems associated with combat support in a highly mobile environment are important, particularly those associated with engineer support. We have a revolutionary aircraft in the AV-8; how do we integrate this capability into our maneuver warfare concepts?

SCHARFEN: General Gray, thank you for the time that you have given to us. Is there any final, wrap-up statement that you would like to make about maneuver warfare?

GRAY: I would like to reiterate that what we have been discussing here is a style of warfare. It is not a revolutionary concept, but a philosophy on how to fight that is based on some time-honored principles. I think that some of the discussions on the subject have become debates on semantics when they should have been debates on the merits of alternative tactics and techniques. The subject is worthy of the attention and study of all Marines, at all levels.

AWR

¹ William S. Lind, "Defining Maneuver Warfare for the Marine Corps", *Marine Corps Gazette*, (March, 1980) p. 55.

² In Lt General Trainor's approach he identifies six factors of modern war for the high intensity modern battlefield to include: Intelligence, Electronics, Maneuver, Combined Arms, Flexible Logistics and C³ (Command, Control and Communications).