

SLIDES ON "PATTERNS OF CONFLICT"

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PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

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OUTLINE

• BACKGROUND

• HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION

• SYNTHESIS

PURPOSE

- To discern a Pattern for Successful Operations
- To help generalize Tactics and Strategy
- To find a basis for Grand Strategy

BACKGROUND

AIR-to-AIR

GENERALIZATION

- Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly while outturning an adversary.
- Suggests a fighter with a higher aerodynamic G and higher turn rate/lower turn radii for positive energy rates -- but not necessarily higher turn rates/lower turn radii for negative energy rates.
- In other words, suggests a fighter that can be used to pick and choose engagement opportunities -- yet has a fast transient ("natural hook") that can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender.

IDEA EXPANSION

- Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo than our adversaries -- or better yet, get inside adversary's Observation-Decision-Action time scales.
- Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries -- since our adversaries can only perceive an opponent's image that does not match the real (fast transient) opponent they are competing against.

EXAMPLES

- Blitzkrieg vs Maginot Line Mentality (1940)
- F-86 vs MiG-15 (1951 - 53)
- Israeli Raid (1976)

NEW CONCEPTION

- ACTION: Exploit operations and weapons that:
 - Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations and decisions, fast tempo, fast transient maneuvers, quick kill),
 - Inhibit an adversary's capacity to adapt to such an environment (cloud or distort his observations and decisions)

- GOAL: Collapse adversary's system into confusion and disorder by causing him to over and under react to activity that appears ambiguous, chaotic or misleading.

RECIPE FOR GENERATING CONFUSION AND DISORDER

- Observations
 - Quick/Clear Scanning Sensors
 - Suppressed/distorted signatures
- Activity
 - Quick and precise performance
 - High Speed (supercruise)
 - Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with hi turn rates and lo turn radii
 - Hi pitch rates/Hi roll rates/Hi yaw rates coupled with ease of control
- Kill Mechanism
 - Quick shoot fire control systems and high speed weapons

HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION

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GOAL

- Improve our capacity for independent action

This may mean we need to


- Deprive our adversary of his capacity for independent action.

QUESTIONS

- How do we realize such a goal by waging war?
- Does history give any insight or suggest any useful pattern?

HISTORICAL PATTERN

SUN T'ZU -- "THE ART OF WAR" -- AROUND 400 BC



HISTORICAL PATTERN

Early Commanders

- Alexander
- Hannibal
- Belisarius
- Genghis Khan
- Tamerlane


Impression

- Early Commanders seem consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu
- Western Commanders more directly concerned with winning the battle
- Eastern Commanders closer to Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter adversary prior to battle


Action

Cheng and Ch'i

BATTLE OF CANNAE



MONGOL STRATEGIC MANEUVER



HERAT

HISTORICAL PATTERN

18th Century Theoreticians

- Saxe
- Bourcet
- Guibert
- Du Teil

Theme

- Mobility/fluidity of force
- Cohesion
- Dispersion and concentration
- Plan with several branches
- Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives
- Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced

Action

Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he applied these ideas as the basis for deception and surprise to defeat superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he relied increasingly on pure offensive power in the form of dense infantry columns, massed direct artillery fire, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong resistance -- at an eventually crippling cost in casualties.

American Colonists, Spanish and Russian Guerrillas, in unexpected ways, used environmental background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity as basis for dispersion and concentration to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.

IMPRESSION


The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert seem to be at home with either Regular or Guerrilla Warfare.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ -- "ON WAR" -- 1832

Overemphasis
Decisive Battle

Underemphasis
Strategic Maneuver



Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome friction/uncertainty and failed to address the idea of magnifying adversary friction/uncertainty.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

19th Century Technology

- Railroad/Telegraph
- Quick Fire Artillery
- Machine Gun
- Repeating Rifle
- Barbed Wire
- Trenches

Early Trends

- Emphasized massed firepower and rail logistics to support it
- Increased emphasis on a holding defense and flanking maneuvers on a broad front to gain a decision
- Use of frontal assaults by infantry supported by artillery barrages against regions of strong resistance

Result

- Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics network suppressed deception, surprise and mobility of any operation.

KEY POINTS

• The massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network -- coupled with the influence of a Clausewitzian battle philosophy -- "telegraphed" any punch hence minimized the possibility of deception, surprise and mobility to gain a decisive edge.

• In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the:

- American Civil War (1861-65)
- Austro-Prussian War (1866)
- Franco-Prussian War (1870)
- Boer War (1899-1902)
- Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
- World War I (1914-18)

WORLD WAR I

● PLANS AND EXECUTION

● STAGNATION

● FINALE

WORLD WAR I

Action

- Offensives conducted on wide fronts
- Evenness of advance maintained to protect flanks and provide artillery support as advance makes headway
- Reserves thrown in whenever attack held up -- against regions or points of strong resistance

Reaction

- Defense organized into depth of successive belts of fortified terrain
- Massed artillery and machinegun fire designed to arrest and pin down attacker
- Counter-attack to win back lost ground

Result

- Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed infantry and firepower.

WORLD WAR I

A WAY OUT

Idea

● Infiltration Tactics

● Guerrilla Tactics

Authors

● Capt Laffargue
● Gen Von Hutier?
● Gen Ludendorff

● T.E. Lawrence
● Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

Action

- Brief but intense artillery bombardment to disrupt/suppress defenses and obscure the assault.
- Assault by constantly reinforced special teams (stormtroopers) trained for cohesion and equipped with grenades, light machine guns, and light mortars with orders to avoid opposition and pour (infiltrate) into any gaps they could find or create.
- Follow-up teams of infantry, machine gunners, mortars, field engineers and artillery observers move-in to mop-up isolated centers of resistance.
- Reserves are fed through gaps from the rear to enlarge gaps and breaches along paths of least resistance and consolidate gains against counter-attack.
In this way reserves are employed to support success instead of trying to redeem failure against regions of heavy resistance.

Idea

- Achieve a tactical breakthrough in order to gain the opportunity to apply the strongest form of attack: envelopment.

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

- Result
 - Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with ultimate failure at corps/army level.

- Why?
 - Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic reserves to reinforce against hardened resistance -- hence at the strategic level, he seduced himself into supporting failure not success.
 - Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault.
 - Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper exploitation of breakthrough.
 - Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and reinforce successful advances.
 - Elastic Defense (when used) as developed by the Germans and practiced by Petain.

WORLD WAR I

Guerrilla Warfare
(a la T. E. Lawrence)

Action

- Gain support of population. Must "arrange the minds" of friend, foe and neutral alike. Must "get inside their minds".
- Must "be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas" (intonspicuousness and fluidity-of-action). Must be an "attack-in-depth".
- Tactics "should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes" with "use of the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place".
- Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for "never affording a target" and "never on the defensive except by accident and in error".

Idea

- Disintegrate existing regime's ability to govern.

IMPRESSION

- Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to Irregular or Guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence.
- Why? Both use fluidity-of-action and cohesion of small units to concentrate strength against weakness -- but at different levels of concentration.

MAJOR ADVANCES
BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND II

LIGHTNING WAR (BLITZKRIEG)

- Infiltration Tactics of 1918 were mated with:

Tank
 Motorized Artillery
 Tactical Aircraft
 Motor Transport
 Better Communications

by

JFC Fuller
 Heinz Guderian

- Result:
 - Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region about 1-2 kilometers wide at two or more points on a narrow front with armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.

GUERRILLA WAR

- Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics were codified by Mao Tse-Tung.
- Result:
 - Modern Guerrilla Warfare has become an overall political, economic, psychological and military framework for "total war".