

EUROPE AT WAR

BACKGROUNDS AND MAINSPRINGS OF THE STRUGGLE

BY LOUIS E. VAN NORMAN

FOR the causes of the titanic struggle now moving Europe, it is necessary to go back a little into history.

Europe's political development, during the past four or five centuries, has been largely conditioned by what international law writers term the "continental conception." The Holy Roman Empire, with its claim for the dominance of the Emperor and the subordination of the other states, was followed by the independent sovereignty doctrine. This maintained that every nation was not only free and sovereign, but that it was equal to every other nation in the councils of the continent. This conception was succeeded, in the middle of the past century, by the idea of the "concert of Europe." It came to be believed that an agreement of the Great Powers,—which, since 1870, have been Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Austria, and Italy,—should determine the policies of the continent and keep the peace. Every dispute between nations, little or big, was considered as a continental matter by this "concert," or general council, which unitedly imposed its will.

THE BALANCE OF POWER DOCTRINE

At the same time there was growing up the condition and doctrine known as the "balance of power." After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which liquidated the Napoleonic conquests and settled the large lines of the map of Europe for more than half a century, the European nations assumed the point of view that any acquisition of power, territory, or population by any one of them entitled all the others to compensation, so that the relative strength and importance might not be disturbed. Hence we find, after every important war since Napoleon's time, the practise of the European "concert" to take part in the settlement of the terms of peace and so adjust the gains of the victor and the losses of the vanquished that the much-discussed "balance" might not be upset. Any threatened disturbance of this balance has always had in it the seeds of a general conflict.

The balance-of-power fetish has been one

of the four great moving causes of the present war. The other three may be briefly set forth as militarism, with its attendant jealousy and the obstacles it presents to many needed social and economic reforms; the age-long world rivalry between Teuton and Slav; and the struggle of Europe's swarming industrial and commercial nations for the markets of Asia.

The preponderance acquired by Prussia through her victory over France in 1870-71 and its increase by the alliance of the German Empire with Austria and Italy has resulted in those European alliances which have made the alignment in the present conflict.

HOW THE ALLIANCES CAME TO BE

Bismarck's fear of France and his hatred of the Napoleonic tradition as exemplified in Louis Napoleon was the underlying cause. In order to maintain a strong front against the republic, he brought about the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria in 1879. This agreement, which was not known to the world until nine years later, marks the beginning of the division of Europe into two hostile camps. In 1882 the Iron Chancellor was able to convince the Italians that they should cast in their lot with the powers of the center of the continent, and the Triple Alliance, or *Dreibund*, was born. In pursuance of his ideal of a friendless France, Bismarck, before approaching Italy, had attempted unsuccessfully to get Russian adhesion to a *Dreikaiserbund* (League of the Three Emperors). England could not be tempted by either side.

In 1890 Bismarck fell from power, and France came to an understanding with Russia. The next year the Treaty of Alliance was signed, which, however, was not made public until 1894. For a decade the Dual Alliance of France and Russia faced the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, with the odds in favor of the *Dreibund*.

During the first years of the twentieth century, however, there came about a shifting of the balance. Italy, estranged from France over the occupation of Tunis in 1881, and because of a vexatious tariff war, became



THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND GROUPS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

reconciled to her Latin sister in 1901. In May, 1903, King Edward VII paid his memorable visit to Paris. Thanks to the diplomatic exchanges begun by this monarch, Britain and France, in April, 1904, signed an omnibus treaty settling all their differences in Africa. Shortly afterwards a secret under-

standing was arrived at between the two countries which, despite official denials, is now understood to have provided for British aid to France in case of an attack by Germany. This was the famous *Entente Cordiale*, or Cordial Understanding. In 1907 Great Britain and Russia, long at odds over

their respective spheres of influence in Persia and other parts of the Near East, made up their differences in a treaty.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Meanwhile, the French had begun their pacific penetration of Morocco, and the German Kaiser had made his spectacular visit to Tangier (1905) and demanded that Germany's rights in North Africa be safeguarded. The Moroccan question was supposed to have been settled by the famous conference of Algeciras (1906). This conference, which brought out the support of England to France, proved that the *Entente Cordiale*, which had grown out of the treaty of 1904, approximated the strength of an alliance. When, as has already been said, Russia and England agreed over their Near Eastern interests, the Dual Alliance had expanded into the Triple Entente.

Startling events soon drew the world's attention to eastern Europe. The Turkish revolution, in 1908, found echoes in several of the provinces formerly under Ottoman suzerainty. In February, 1908, Europe was startled by the news that Bulgaria had thrown off the over-lordship of Turkey, and that Austria-Hungary had formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces had been given to her "for military occupation and administration" by the Congress of Berlin, which followed the Turko-Russian war of 1877. All Europe was expecting a continental war. The tension was ended in March, 1909, however, by a peremptory intimation from the German Kaiser to the Russian Czar that if his support of Servia's protest against Austria's absorption of the Bosniaks should lead to war with the Dual Monarchy, Germany would "appear in shining armor at the side of her ally."

Russia never forgot this check. The two Balkan wars which amazed and frightened the continent in 1912 and 1913 were regarded by Austria and Germany as having been instigated by Russia in revenge. The Czar, however, has apparently seen these in the light of additional Slavonic checks by the Teuton. Meanwhile, Germany again challenged France in Morocco by her dramatic stroke at Agadir (1911). Britain supported France vigorously, and it was seen that the Triple Entente had solidified into what was virtually an alliance.

THE POLITICAL CHESS BOARD OF EUROPE

The continent is now divided into four groups of nations: (1) The close alliance of

the middle European powers,—Germany, Austria, and Italy,—into the Triple Alliance, or Dreibund; (2) the Triple Entente, or understanding approaching an alliance, between Great Britain, France, and Russia, (France and Russia being formally allied); (3) the small group of buffer nations whose neutrality and integrity have been recognized or guaranteed,—Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, fronting on France, Belgium, and Germany, whose neutrality was guaranteed in 1867, and Switzerland; (4) the other countries, more or less isolated, some of them, however, having regional problems of their own. These include the Balkan nations,—Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Greece, Turkey, and Rumania,—formerly a sort of Balkan extension of the Triple Alliance, but within the past year drawn within the orbit of Russia; the Scandinavian nations,—Norway, Sweden and Denmark (the latter, although neutral, still involved in the general fate of Scandinavia),—and the Iberian nations, Spain and Portugal. Any increase of the power of any one of these groups would alone have been sufficient to bring about a European war. This alignment constituted the balance of power.

SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE DREIBUND

Each of the two great alliances now locked in the giant struggle for mastery presents some coherence and consistency and yet a good deal of diversity and internal antagonism. The two bureaucratic, highly centralized, powerful military nations of the center of the continent, Germany and Austria, are dominated by German-speaking men. Their interests are largely similar. Even the problems of each arise chiefly out of the fact that their governments are more dynastic than national. The Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs are faced by racial questions of a similar nature, although Austria has them more intensely and to a greater degree than Germany. Both find the Slav within their borders and on their boundaries their chief enemy. Germany has, in addition, British commercial and naval rivalry to the north and French desire for revenge on the west. Austria has the problem of Slavs on the south as well as to the east and within her own borders.

Meanwhile a suspicious, unfriendly Italian neighbor and assumed ally, hungering to reclaim *Italia Irredenta*, begrudges her an outlet on the Adriatic. The Austro-Italian question arises from the fact that Austria

still possesses the only lands on the European continent inhabited by Italian-speaking people not under the Italian flag. All ancient Italy, from the Alps to the end of the toe of the boot, has been brought under one sceptre, except south Tyrol, Trieste, and the rest of that shore line of the northern Adriatic which Italians call *Italia Irredenta*—Italy unredeemed. To the loss of Corsica to France and Malta to Great Britain the Italian seems reconciled. The government at Rome, however, and the Italian people cannot forget that Austria holds all of continental Italy which is not subject to King Victor Emmanuel, and, moreover, that she has kept up a constant and vexatious campaign of Austrianization against those portions of Venetia and Lombardy which the Italians regard as their own.

While Germany's and Austria's problems are acute largely within their own borders (Germany's colonies have never been regarded as profitable), Italy's concern for her international position has been intensified during the past two years by the acquisition of Tripoli. Italians have been very thoughtfully weighing the advantages accruing to them from their alliance with Germany and Austria; such as military assistance, financial promotion, etc., against their traditional friendship with England, their historic love for France, and the ease with which British and French battleships, if unfriendly, might cut off Tripoli and close in the peninsula upon the political, economic, and social revolution which King Victor Emmanuel is reported to have recently said is likely to make Italy the next republic. All of which goes towards explaining why Italy will try her best to remain neutral.

DIVERGENCE IN THE ENTENTE

There is more diversity than agreement in the Triple Entente. Hostility to the Dreibund and fear of its tremendous military power have been the main actuating motives. Government, institutions and traditions tend to unite the central European powers. But it is exactly government, institutions and tradition that put the members of the Triple Entente as far apart as the poles. Constitutional, republican England (a monarchy only in name), with her widely extended empire and her unmilitary people, is practically allied to republican, highly centralized France, which has not yet lost her memory of the great Napoleon. France also has a colonial empire, and a navy which is claimed to be second only to that of England. Britain

befriends France both because she sympathizes with western liberalism and because she has long feared and suspected the German. Moreover, the German has been crowding her in the race for the world's trade and has built a powerful navy to protect what German merchants have won. It is the German contention that one of the chief causes of the war is jealousy of the commercial success which the subjects of the Kaiser have achieved.

This friendship with the republic across the channel and a desire to protect her Asiatic dependencies bring Britain into a strange semi-partnership with the autocratic Russian Empire, with which she has naturally nothing in common, with which she is at enmity along many frontiers of the world, and with which she will inevitably have to dispute the prizes of the war, should the Triple Entente be victorious. But France wants back Alsace-Lorraine from Germany, and French bankers hold almost all the huge Russian national debt. To protect her investments in Russia, and to consummate her revenge on Germany for the humiliation of 1870, France cannot break with the Muscovite. Britain needs France for her own protection against Germany. A Germany triumphant over France would mean a Germany within striking distance of English shores. France needs Britain for her national safety. Therefore, French and Russian armies have menaced the German frontiers, and British warships have for years been awaiting the orders, "Find and sink the Germans."

FORCES AND STAYING POWERS OF EACH CAMP

In staying qualities the two great groups, if each maintains its strength undiminished, are about equal. The Dreibund commands better equipped, better trained and more easily handled armies. On the water, however, the Entente has a great advantage. Naval experts are wont to measure sea strength by tonnage, number of guns, and weight of projectiles. Measured by this test, the central European powers are only half as powerful as the combination against them. The figures given for the Entente are, in round numbers, tonnage, 2,000,000; guns, 800; projectile weight, 550,000; those for the Dreibund are: tonnage, 600,000; guns, 280; projectile weight, 200,000. The countries of the Triple Alliance are more compact and will find it easier to supply and move their fighting forces. Both Germany and Austria, however, depend very largely for food supplies upon importation. The government at



THE RACIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MODERN EUROPE, WHICH HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MOVING CAUSES OF THE PRESENT WAR

(Of the areas left in white, Turkey is non-European, Albania non-European and an insoluble mixture in addition, Hungary probably of non-European origin, and Switzerland, divided up between German, Frenchman and Italian, is so small on this map that an indication of division by race is practically impossible. There are in round figures, 140,000,000 Slavs in Europe, 100,000,000 Teutons (including Scandinavians), 100,000,000 to 110,000,000 Latins, and 45,000,000 Anglo-Saxons)

 TEUTONIC	 LATIN	 SLAV
 ANGLO-SAXON	 GREEK	 RUMANIAN

Berlin recently announced that it could hold out, with blockaded ports, for a year. The bulk of the land fighting forces of the Entente,—the Russians,—are less highly trained and less efficient than the Germans. Britain, moreover, it is said, cannot live more than two months on the food she has within her borders at any one time. On the other hand, France produces surplus food-stuffs, chiefly wheat, and Russia is a limitless granary. England maintains her mighty fleet to keep her doors open for food. If her ships should destroy the German navy and blockade German ports, the Kaiser's armies may be expected to take their attention from France and devote all their energies to seizing the grain lands of Russia.

THE BLIGHT OF MILITARISM

The blight of militarism has been on Europe since the Franco-Prussian war. More than 16,000,000 trained soldiers in the first

lines and in the reserves have wasted the substance of the continent and lowered its productive capacity. The Triple Alliance in times of peace has a million and a half men under arms. In times of war this may be quickly increased to 8,000,000. For purposes of calculation in the present war, Italy is uncertain. Her quarter million soldiers in peace and 1,500,000 in war cannot therefore be surely placed with the Dreibund, which can, however, muster for war six million without her. On a peace footing, the *Entente* counts 2,000,000 men; in war it can muster upwards of 10,000,000. The very presence of these armies in times of peace is an incitement to war. Officers look forward to a conflict as their chance of advancement, and the peoples are accustomed to the sight of the paraphernalia of battle. Besides the economic burden of supporting them, these armaments have bred jealousy and have fostered a spirit of caste and autocracy that has kept the peo-

ples of the continent from many of the economic, social, and political reforms of which they are in sore need.

In every one of the six major powers, revolution of varying degrees of seriousness was the seeming alternative to war. In the aggressive powers, those that took the initiative,—Austria, Russia, and Germany,—military oligarchies have for years been facing a social-democratic revolution. Russia is still struggling out of Asiatic barbarism. Germany, with all her civilization, remains a feudalistic autocracy, with a "debating society" for a parliament. Austria is a polyglot bureaucracy, which has held together mainly by desire for protection against Russia and personal loyalty to the Hapsburg family. In none of the three are franchise rights fully recognized. In all of them industry is taxed to the breaking point. Britain, France, and Italy also have their questions of land, and labor, and Britain has Ireland. Through all of them the "disintegrating ferment" of Socialism is preparing for the fall of monarchy and special privilege. It was inevitable that militarism should force a general war or fall of its own weight. Moreover, militarism has expected this war for twenty years. During the past decade this expectation has been so widespread that one of the aims of taxation in Germany and Austria has been providing funds for the contest.

THE STRUGGLE OF TEUTON AGAINST SLAV

Pan-Germanism has baited Pan-Slavism, and Pan-Slavism has challenged Pan-Germanism for half a century. Pan-Germanism, represented by Germany, is a well-defined movement which seeks the common welfare of the Germanic peoples of Europe and the advance of Teutonic culture. Pan-Slavism, championed by Russia, is less clearly formulated, but it, for its part, seeks a union of all Slavonic folk for common welfare. These two aims are irreconcilable and the two propaganda have become the incitement to war. There are in Europe approximately 80,000,000 German-speaking people, of whom 68,000,000 are in the German Empire, and the other 12,000,000 in Austria and Hungary. But there are 140,000,000 Slavs on European soil,—in Russia, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and in the Polish provinces of Austria and Germany, in Bohemia and the other Slavonic parts of the Dual Monarchy. Russia has always regarded herself as the protectress of the Slav peoples and any attempt to bring Slavs under Teutonic domination is looked upon as a direct challenge to her.

From Lapland to the Black Sea the contact between these two virile races, the Teuton and the Slav, is always seething, and there has seemed to be no solution but an appeal to the sword. This bitterness has been intensified by the unnatural political geography which the Berlin Congress,—maker of nations on the map,—forced on Europe. The right of almost every small nation to rule itself has been ignored.

A FIGHT FOR NEW MARKETS

In the last analysis, Europe's fight is a fight for markets. The German Kaiser has been called the best living drummer for German goods. The Teuton's "Drang nach Osten" has been responsible for most of the Kaiser's *weltpolitik*. In the Near East are the grain fields of Mesopotamia, where the race began, and in the Far East are the vast markets of India and China. The great financial interests of Europe, the Jewish bankers and the immense industrial establishments, have been seeking the commercial conquest of Asia for a quarter of a century. This has been behind the Eastern question, with the elimination of the Turk as a factor. Whatever great power possesses Constantinople attains enormous advantages for the domination of Asia and holds the highways of trade to the Near and Middle East. Britain controls the Suez Canal. But German capital has built railroads through Asia Minor. Russia, by patient intrigue, has welded the little Balkan States until a Slavonic wedge from the Black Sea to the Adriatic now bars the German's way to the Orient. Berlin and Vienna have replied by keeping the Balkans at war, by establishing the "open sore" of Albania, and preventing the Serbs, whether Servian or Montenegrin, from being Russia's advance guard on the Adriatic. German finance must have more lands and people to exploit. England threatens the Kaiser's expansion on the sea, while Russia, the largest military empire of Europe, and France, her strongest military republic, close the Germans in on both land sides. Therefore, at any cost must the power of the Balkan league be broken. Therefore, the little Sanjak of Novibazar between Servia and Montenegro (given to the latter at the end of the Balkan wars) is frantically clung to by the Austrians as the gateway to Salonica and Asia.

HOW THE CRISIS CAME ON

The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, in the last days of June, was the first link in the chain of

events which have brought on the great war play for which Europe has been preparing fearfully for a generation. Swiftly sketched, the drama moved this way. Austria claimed that Serbia, as a nation, was responsible for the assassination. She sent an ultimatum to Belgrade, making demands that the Servians, as a people determined to maintain their independence, could not admit. She declared war on Serbia and moved an army across the Danube. Austria's attack on Serbia, in the first place, disturbed the delicate balance of power; secondly, it meant the drawing of another people from the Slavonic into the Teutonic system; third, it let loose the flood of militarism which the dikes of reason and civilization had found it so difficult to restrain; fourth, it showed the continent that Germany and Austria still meant to keep open the way to the East, and that German and Austrian goods and German and Austrian capital were henceforth to dom-

inate in the Near East rather than that of Britain, France, and Russia. Austria felt she must chastise the Serbs for assassinating the heir apparent to her throne; Russia could not see one of her Slavonic wards crushed; France, which holds the Russian national debt and regards the Muscovite as her only hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine, prepared to support Russia. Germany, threatened on both sides, felt she must strike quickly. In so doing, the Kaiser's strategy ignored the rights of small neutral states, and, invading Belgium, brought his armies within menacing distance of England. And so we have the British fleet and the British troops as the last great factor in the tremendous conflict. Whatever happens,—whichever side or nations be victorious,—it seems inevitable that, as a result, there will be a radical change in the whole social and economic, as well as political and geographical structure of Europe.

HOW EUROPE'S ARMIES TAKE THE FIELD

BY T. LOTHROP STODDARD

THE idea underlying all modern Continental armies is universal military service,—that compulsory instruction of every able-bodied citizen which has resulted in the "Nation in Arms." In itself this idea is very old. It prevailed in the city-states of Ancient Greece and in the Roman Republic. But throughout the Middle Ages it almost dropped out of sight, while the subsequent rise of despotic monarchies apparently gave it its death-blow. At the close of the Eighteenth Century European armies were invariably small bodies of highly-trained professional soldiers (largely foreign mercenaries), officered by noblemen inspired by Feudal loyalty to their Royal over-lord, the King. Such an army was pre-eminently the "King's Own"; it was quite out of touch with the nation at large whose chief military contribution in peace or war was the payment of taxes for the support of the King's army.

The French Revolution gave this military system its death-blow and laid the foundation for the existing order of things. With the overthrow of the French Crown the old "King's army" went to pieces, but since



BELGIAN BUGLERS CALLING SOLDIERS TO ARMS



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THE ROYAL GERMAN HUSSARS

France was assailed by all Europe she was forced to improvise an army or die. The army was found through the new principle of the "levée en masse",—the rising of the nation to resist the invader. The levée en masse produced enormous masses of men, entirely untrained, of course, but full of fanatical courage, and since their opponents were small armies of professional soldiers too valuable to be rashly risked by generals possessing no adequate reserve forces, the French succeeded in beating off their enemies, and when a campaign or two had turned these

raw levies into veteran soldiers the vast French armies overran all Europe. True, the levée en masse had to be supplemented by the "conscription," (the taking of a certain percentage of available men by lot), yet even under the First Empire the French armies were more "national" than the old "King's armies" had ever been.

PRUSSIA'S SYSTEM,—*"THE NATION IN ARMS"*

However, neither the levée en masse nor the conscription produced the "nation in



GERMAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH



GERMAN INFANTRY WITH CAMP KITCHEN

arms" of the present day. The volunteer or conscript of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Empire became in his turn a professional soldier and the exempted majority of the nation remained as untrained and unmilitary as before. The next step toward the modern system was taken by Prussia. In the Eighteenth Century Prussia had been Europe's military teacher and possessed the most perfect "King's army" of the day. But the war with Napoleon in 1806 revealed the helplessness of the old order in face of the new French system. Once beaten at Jena, there were no reserves to reform the shattered army and resistance absolutely collapsed. However, in the very depth of her humiliation Prussia found her salvation. Napoleon had limited the Prussian army to the merely nominal figure of 42,000 men, but the Prussians cleverly turned the difficulty by making this small force consist largely of officers and under-officers, passing the entire youth of the country through the ranks in quick relays of intensive training, while at the same time possessing in the abnormally large number of officers and subalterns the permanent framework of a large army whenever the trained privates should be recalled

from civil life to the colors. Here at last was the germ of that short-term, universal military service which has produced the modern "nation in arms."

Nevertheless, nearly half a century was to elapse before the new system came into general use. The importance of the Prussian innovation was not realized by other nations, while in military matters as in everything else the political reaction following Napoleon's overthrow brought about a partial return to Eighteenth Century conditions. The "nation in arms" had a very uncongenial sound to absolute monarchs menaced by popular discontent; accordingly, long-service professional armies again became the rule, even Prussia showing no signs of military



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TROOP OF GERMAN INFANTRY READY FOR ACTION



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GERMAN OFFICERS MINING A BRIDGE

progress for some time. But the troubled period after 1848 and the cry for German Unity spurred Prussia to action, and under the guidance of that brilliant galaxy of military talent personified by Von Roon and Moltke Prussia perfected the system which in essence prevails to the present hour.

The proposition of the "nation in arms" once assumed as a theoretical necessity, three problems were bound up with its successful realization. These were: (1) Classification for future military service of the trained citizens returned to civil life; (2) their rapid assemblage at the required moment; (3) their effective handling upon the theater of hostilities. These three problems are best summed up in the words "Reserve," "Mobilization," and "General Staff."

THE "THREE-LINE" RESERVE SYSTEM

The Reserve problem is clearly the first for solution. Here is the entire able-bodied citizenship of a large state liable to military service during a long period of years,—generally between the ages of twenty and forty-five. How does this work out in practise? The first step is self-evident. Every year all the able-bodied young men of twenty are called to the colors and pass a certain length

of time (generally two or three years), in acquiring their military training. Thereafter they return to civil life. It is obvious that in course of time millions of trained men may be available in case of war. But it is equally obvious that they should be recalled for war-service not en masse but by degrees, with due regard for maximum military fitness and minimum disorganization of the social and economic fabric of society.

All this was worked out by the Prussians in their generally adopted "three-line" system of "Active Reserve," "Landwehr" and "Landsturm." The Active Reserve is composed of those citizens only two or three years out of their military service. In wartime these join their old regiments of the peace-army at once, and since these regiments always possess an abnormally large proportion of officers and under-officers, the army which takes the field immediately after the outbreak of war is automatically doubled without being diluted, since the framework is fully equal to the increase in the ranks, while the reservists have not had time to lose the knack of their military duties. The next step is the calling out of the "Landwehr," or second line,—citizens in the prime of life, generally about equal in numbers to the field army. These second-line reservists have already been enrolled in separate Landwehr regiments, with their own framework of officers and under-officers. They are at first used exclusively for garrison duty, guarding communications, etc., although after they have gotten back into shape many of them are sent to the front to repair the wastage of the field army. The third line, or "Landsturm," is not called out except as a last resort. It is obvious that these men of middle life, with settled positions and large families, will be relatively incapable of performing good military service, while their call to the colors will produce the greatest hardship and disorganization in the civil life of the nation. In any event they are used only for home duty.

REGIONAL MOBILIZATION

Having thus organized and classified a nation's trained citizenship, the next step is to assemble it in the hour of peril. This process is known as "mobilization." Applying as it does to millions of individuals scattered over a whole country, mobilization is naturally an extremely complex and delicate affair, yet rapid mobilization is absolutely necessary, for since modern warfare has become more and more a matter of initial crush-



TYPES OF AUSTRIAN OFFICERS

(1) Uhlán (Landwehr); (2) Austrian (Landwehr); (3) Bosnian Rifle-man; (4) Austrian Rifle-man; (5) Hungarian Infantryman; (6 and 7) Tyrolese Sharp-shooters; (8) Bosnian Infantry; (9) Hungarian Infantry; (10) Hungarian Hussar; (11) Hussar (Landwehr); (12) Hungarian Rifle-man; (13) Mounted Rifle-man; (14) Bosnian Dragoon; (15) Marine

ing blows followed up relentlessly to the end, it is quite plain that the nation which mobilizes more quickly and smoothly than its opponent is already half assured of victory. The key to the riddle was found by the Prussians in their "regional army-corps" system, whereby the army is divided into army corps, each corps permanently located in a certain region and recruiting therefrom. This works well in both peace and war. The youth does his military service near home, mobilization generally finds the reservist within call of his barracks, and everyone goes to war surrounded by comrades of his own kind. The chief military objection to regional mobilization is the possibility of a smaller but long-service professional army smashing suddenly into the midst of the process, but as all the Conti-

mental states to-day have the same system, this objection is of no practical importance. After mobilization comes "concentration," or the transport of the assembled army corps to the theater of hostilities and their junction therein as an articulated fighting machine. To-day this is largely a railroad problem, and strategic railway lines cover the map of Europe.

THE GENERAL STAFF

The third problem solved by the Prussian theorists of the mid-Nineteenth Century was raised by the enormous size of modern armies and by the extensive area of battlefields consequent upon the introduction of long-range rifles and artillery. Only a century ago the commander-in-chief, seated upon an adjacent hill, could overlook and direct the whole





THE PICTURESQUE ALGERIAN TROOPS ("TURCOS") IN THE FRENCH SERVICE

course of a battle. This has now become impossible. Accordingly, to ensure smooth coordination, the directing group of officers must be previously trained, not merely to think, but to *feel* alike, so that a few broad general orders will ensure harmonious development of a major operation extending over a wide theater of action. This has been effected by the "General Staff," the keystone of the modern edifice of war.

Such are the three solutions which enabled the Prussians to crush the old long-service, professional armies of Austria and France in 1866 and 1870, together with the French "levée en masse" of 1871. Prussia thereupon became the military schoolmaster of Europe, exactly as she had done a century before, after the victories of Frederick the Great. All the Continental armies are today patterned on the Prussian model, albeit they differ sufficiently in numbers, composition, and organization to warrant a brief comparative analysis.

ARMY STATISTICS

Before proceeding to our detailed examination of the various European military establishments, one word of explanation seems necessary. The press just now is full of statistics giving the impression that nearly 20,000,000 soldiers are engaged in the present struggle. Now the true figures are tremendous enough, but they are certainly far

below the current "estimates." There is no doubt that the contending nations possess 20,000,000 able-bodied men, all of whom might ultimately see service should the war prove to be of long duration. But the frightful economic strain involved in the present conflict, together with the very nature of modern warfare itself, combine to make a European war extending over two or three years a highly improbable contingency. Everything points to the conclusion that this struggle will be decided in one or, at most, two campaigns. It has, therefore, seemed advisable to give only the net figures of trained troops available for field service during this period.

We must never forget that modern warfare is a highly technical science demanding expert knowledge of those engaged in its pursuit. Its very instruments are useless in unskilled hands. To train even a private soldier is a process of months, especially in the cavalry and artillery branches, while the production of capable officers and under-officers requires years. Furthermore, modern warfare has become to such an extent a matter of artillery practise and the consumption of these slowly produced objects is so rapid that the size of an army is practically restricted by its quota of gun batteries and reserve material. When we add the complications of transport, for the feeding and supply of these vast masses of men, we can



FRENCH TROOPS ON THE MARCH TOWARDS THE GERMAN FRONTIER

readily see the practical limitations imposed upon the size of field armies. Every military expert knows that to send hosts of half-trained infantry, commanded by virtually untrained officers and without the proper proportion of cavalry, artillery, and allied technical branches, would be the sending of so many lambs to the slaughter. And since this is an experts' war, such blunders will assuredly not take place. With these preliminary remarks in mind, let us begin with the common archetype,—the German army.

GERMANY'S EFFECTIVE MILITARY STRENGTH

During the last few years the German army has been greatly strengthened, but not to such an extent as to make the theoretical universal military service a matter of actual practise. Germany's great population of nearly 70,000,000 gives her a superfluity of men, and only half the able-bodied youth of the Empire actually do service with the colors, the other half being assigned to the so-called "Ersatz-Re-

NEW UNIFORM,
FRENCH INFANTRY

serve," where they get a light militia training. In war time, however, these "Ersatz" reservists are called up, the younger to the active army regimental depots to be drilled like ordinary recruits for service in the field, the rest apportioned according to age among the Landwehr regiments or in the Landsturm. This assures Germany a plentiful supply of recruits in the critical period two or three months after the beginning of war without the disorganization of the Landwehr units by drafts for decimated field regiments. The peace strength of the German field army (deducting permanent garrison units, depot troops, etc.) is about 800,000, with 650,000 active reservists called to the colors at once and with 400,000 young, able-bodied Ersatz reservists training in the regimental depots and fit for service in a short time. The Landwehr is subdivided into two "bans," according to age, each ban numbering about 600,000. The trained portion of the Landsturm, some 400,000 strong, consisting of men between thirty-nine and forty-five years of age, would be fairly



CONSCRIPTION IN RUSSIA: DRAWING LOTS FOR MILITARY SERVICE

effective for home-guard and garrison duty. The untrained portion, slightly more numerous, would probably not be called out in any event. Here, then, in round numbers, is the effective military strength of Germany in the present crisis:

<i>Field Army</i> (peace strength and active reserves).....	1,450,000
<i>Ersatz Recruits</i> (available for active service in a short time)....	400,000
<i>Landwehr</i> (1st ban) (fit for field work after a time if necessary) ..	600,000
<hr/>	
Total effective field forces..	2,450,000
<i>Landwehr</i> (2nd ban) (for garrison and covering duty).....	600,000
<i>Landsturm</i> (trained) (for garrison and home duty only).....	400,000
<hr/>	
Grand total effective forces..	3,450,000

AUSTRIA'S THREE-FOLD ORGANIZATION

Turning next to Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, we find a state of things very different from the highly unified German military machine. The peculiar constitution

of the Dual Monarchy is reflected in its army. Austria-Hungary has, in fact, three separate military establishments: the common Imperial-Royal army ("Kaiserliche-Koenigliche"), the Austrian "Landwehr," and the Hungarian "Honved." These last two terms must not be confused with the German Landwehr, or 2nd reserves. In the Dual Monarchy the annual classes coming up for military training are apportioned among the three establishments and ever after remain subject to service only in the particular establishment to which they have been originally assigned, each establishment having its own reserve organization. The result of all this is a highly complex system which makes mobilization both slow and difficult. Fortunately for the striking power of Austria-Hungary, the Imperial-Royal army is far stronger than the other two establishments put together, its peace strength being 340,000 effectives, whereas the "Landwehr" and "Honved" number only 48,000 and 36,000, respectively. As no official figures of reserves or Landsturm are published, the war strength of Austria-Hungary is somewhat problematical. The best estimates of the effective field army are somewhat as follows:



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RUSSIAN CAVALRY ON THE MARCH

<i>Imperial-Royal Army</i> (with reserves)	600,000
<i>"Landwehr"</i> and <i>"Honved"</i> (with reserves)	230,000
<i>Ersatz Reserves</i> , etc. (available for active service later).....	220,000
<hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/>	
Total effective field forces...	1,050,000

UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN FRANCE

Having thus considered the fighting power of Germany and Austria-Hungary, let us now examine the military strength of their opponents. First of all, France. The stationary population of the Republic (to-day only 39,600,000) has made France the classic example of absolutely universal mili-



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SERBIAN VOLUNTEERS ON THE WAY TO ENLIST



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BRITISH INFANTRY ON THE MARCH

tary service. France's desperate efforts to maintain a field army as large as that of her German neighbor have resulted in the enrolment of every Frenchman not positively unfit for military service. Indeed, even men with slight physical defects are required to serve in the non-combatant branches of the army. In principle the German three-line reserve system is in force, though with a different classification. The Landwehr and Landsturm are here combined into the so-called "Territorial Army," with a complete organization of its own, the Landwehr classes composing the Territorial first-line, the Landsturm classes forming the Territorial reserve. Another point to be noted is that since France possesses a large colonial empire, she maintains a distinct colonial army of the old professional type, it being composed of long-service troops, obtained mainly through voluntary enlistment and consisting of vigorous men in the prime of life.

These "regulars," seasoned by actual foreign service, should prove of high fighting power, since the long-service regular, man for man, is normally superior to the ordinary short-term citizen soldier. Again, in addition to this white colonial force, France possesses a considerable native army recruited among the Arab-Berbers of Algeria and the warlike blacks of Senegal. The white colonial army numbers 47,000, the native troops 93,000, but it is evident that not much more than half these forces could be spared from the colonies for European service.

The effective fighting strength of France is therefore as follows:

<i>Peace Establishment</i> (metropolitan army)	800,000
<i>Reserves</i> (active, available at once)	500,000
<i>Colonial and Native Troops</i> (for European service)	80,000
<hr/>	
Total field army immediately available	1,380,000
<i>Reserves</i> (2nd line) (fit for field work if necessary)	600,000
<hr/>	
Total effective field forces...	1,980,000
<i>Territorial Army</i> (active) (for garrison and covering duty)....	500,000
<i>Territorial Reserves</i> (trained) (for home duty only)	300,000
<hr/>	
Grand total effective forces..	2,780,000

RUSSIA'S SLOW MOBILIZATION

From France let us turn to Russia. Certainly, at first sight, the eastern member of the Triple Entente looks formidable enough to meet both Germany and Austria-Hungary single-handed. Russia's vast population of nearly 180,000,000, together with her huge size, covering one-sixth of the entire land surface of the globe, apparently imply overwhelming armies of soldiers. However, as a matter of fact, the very vastness of the Russian Empire involves such problems of distance and multiplicity of interests that much of its strength can never

be brought to bear on any one given point, while its wretched roads and inadequate railway system prevent the effective development of all the forces possessed by even the European portion. These drawbacks become most apparent during the Russian mobilization, which is far slower than that of any other great power. Reservists often have to walk great distances to arrive at their military depots, and the inadequate train service correspondingly hinders the concentration of the mobilized army corps. So keenly has Russia felt



ENGLISH "TERRITORIALS" SIGNING THE REGIMENTAL ROLL

her handicaps in this respect that she today makes no serious effort to hold Russian Poland, stretching so temptingly between East Prussia and Austrian Galicia, but is mobilizing far to the eastward, which will mean a very long-delayed advance. The Russian peace establishment is certainly enormous, numbering, as it does, about 1,200,000, but of these 200,000 are in Asia (Siberia, Turkestan, and Manchuria), while 100,000 are in Transcaucasia, and neither of these armies can be safely denuded for the European theater of war.

Also, the huge population of European Russia can be drawn upon only to a certain point, since Russia possesses neither the artillery nor the permanent framework of officers and subalterns required for the effective employment of such vast masses of men. The actual strength of the Russian field army which will be employed against Germany and Austria-Hungary will probably be about as follows:

<i>Peace Establishment</i> (European army)	900,000
<i>Reserves</i> (active) (immediately available)	600,000
<i>Second Reserves</i> (available after some time).....	1,100,000
Total effective field forces...	2,600,000

ITALY'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Before discussing the peculiar military establishment of the British Empire, the third member of the Triple Entente, it may be as well to cast a glance at the one great European power still holding aloof from the present struggle,—Italy. The first thing

that strikes one's attention is the fact that despite Italy's large population of 36,000,000 its army is smaller than might be anticipated. Italy's poverty does not permit it to train even half the annual quota of its able-bodied youth, the majority thus relieved from service with the colors receiving either a brief militia training or no military education at all. Furthermore, mobilization is handicapped by three unfavorable factors. In the first place Italy's peninsular shape makes a strict regional distribution of its army corps a strategical impossibility; the bulk of the army must be kept at all times in the extreme north in close proximity to the land frontiers.

Also the still imperfect fusion of Italy's diverse populations has led the government to mix men from every province of the country in the same regimental units, in order to hasten the break-up of local particularism and further Italian Unity. In war-time, however, these combined factors spell a slow and complex mobilization, many reservists having to travel great distances in order to rejoin their regiments. Another unfavorable military factor is the extensive Italian emigration, which deprives the country in a sudden emergency of hundreds of thousands of its most vigorous reservists and entirely disorganizes many military units. As nearly as can be estimated the actual effective strength of the Italian army is as follows:

<i>Peace Establishment</i>	270,000
<i>Reserves</i> (active): (immediately available)	250,000
<i>Mobile Militia</i> (available for field duty after some time).....	300,000
Total effective field army.....	820,000



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ENGLISH BICYCLE ARTILLERY

<i>Territorial Militia</i> (trained): (for garrison and home duty).....	700,000
Grand total effective forces....	1,520,000

THE BRITISH ARMY,—A SURVIVAL

Looked at from the Continental point of view the British army is in every respect a "peculiar institution." Unlike any of the great European military establishments, it is in fact a survival of the old Eighteenth Century system. A small army of long-service, professional soldiers, officered by aristocrats, the British regular army has owed its continued existence to England's insular position and to the fact that until the recent rise of German sea-power the English fleet afforded an absolute guarantee against any possible invasion by a Continental "nation in arms." The British regular army establishment on a peace footing numbers only 156,000 effectives, partly stationed abroad, and though many of the time-expired soldiers are enrolled in a reserve organization, the British army on a war footing is numerically less imposing than that of several minor European states. True, the last few years have seen the formation of the "Territorial Army," a volunteer organization now numbering about 250,000, but military experts everywhere have been a unit in declaring that such militia could not stand the shock of anything like an equal number of disciplined Continental troops. Of course the British regulars, as might be expected of long-service professionals, are undoubtedly better than any other large body of European soldiers, but the "Territorials," with their imperfect equipment and their glaring lack of trained officers and

under-officers, will long be incapable of standing in a Continental line-of-battle.

The same is true of the various contingents now being offered by the various Dominions of the British Empire. The native Indian Army is of course of high fighting quality, but its remoteness from the European theater of war and the dangerous ferment of discontent in India itself preclude the possibility of drafting any considerable portion of it for European service. The so-called "Expeditionary Force" which England has reckoned upon

sending to the Continent in the event of what is now actually taking place has never been placed higher than 160,000 men, and some writers have maintained that even this would strip the home defense of the British Isles in dangerous fashion so long as the enemy's fleet remained undestroyed. The following table shows England's present effective military strength. No mention is made of the Indian Army for reasons above stated, and the Dominion contingents have likewise been omitted, since so many months must pass before these volunteer organizations can be equipped, trained, shipped and fitted for European battlefields that it is most unlikely that they can figure in the present campaign; and since modern wars tend to be of brief duration, the first campaign of the present struggle will very likely prove to be the last as well.

<i>Regular Army</i> (peace footing; partly stationed abroad).....	156,000
<i>Regular Reserve</i> (available at once)	146,000
<i>Special Reserve</i> (rapidly available)	63,000
Total Regular Establishment..	365,000
<i>Territorial Army</i>	251,000
Grand total effective forces....	616,000

BELGIUM, HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND

Since the present war is nothing short of a general conflagration which may ultimately involve every European state, it will not be amiss to devote some space to a brief survey of the military establishments of the minor powers. First and foremost, a few words about that Belgian army that has shown prowess. Belgium has never adopted the

principle of universal military service, but retains the older system of conscription. Her regular army on a peace-footing numbers about 45,000, the trained reserves giving a total of 170,000 effectives in time of war. Alongside this regular establishment there is a local militia, the "Garde Civique," numbering some 45,000. A few of its élite corps rank as high-grade militia, but most of its units are without serious military value.

The neighboring state of Holland, though maintaining a good-sized Colonial Army, has little more than a militia organization for home defense, relying as Holland does upon its dykes to drown the invader's path. A knot of 20,000 regulars forms the nucleus about which would gather the Dutch militia to the number of perhaps 150,000. The third "neutral" state of Western Europe, Switzerland, is much better prepared to maintain its neutrality and would prove a formidable antagonist for the most powerful invaders. Switzerland has long adopted the principle of universal military service; not in the sense of a large standing army fitted for instant attack, but with an entire population of well-trained and organized militiamen, ready for stubborn defense. The warlike nature of its hardy people and the strong barriers of its mountains would make an invasion of Switzerland a dangerous undertaking. In a supreme emergency Switzerland could place nearly 500,000 men in the field.

THE BALKAN STATES

Lastly, there remains a brief consideration of the military strength possessed by the several Balkan peoples. The recent Balkan Wars were so destructive of both men and matériel that the effective fighting power of these countries (Rumania excepted), must be largely a matter of conjecture. According to latest estimates, Serbia and Montenegro



'SERVIAN TROOPS READY FOR ACTION

together can put 300,000 men in the field, Greece another 300,000. The Turkish and Bulgarian matériel captured by these states in the late Balkan Wars should have largely solved the problem of equipment for the present struggle. Bulgaria is in bad shape, disorganized by defeat, semi-bankrupt and very deficient in artillery. She could probably not put more than 250,000 effective troops in line of battle. Rumania, with her untouched resources of men, equipment and supply, is to-day the strongest of all the Balkan powers. She could put about 350,000 effectives into the field. Turkey, like Bulgaria, is still under the shadow of defeat, and cannot have yet repaired her enormous losses of war matériel nor re-formed that shattered framework of trained officers and under-officers so vital to the modern army. Since Turkey's entry into the present struggle would necessarily entail a war with Greece, she would be obliged to station large forces in Western Asia Minor to guard against a Greek invasion and a rising of the dense Hellenic population of the Egean shore. It is therefore doubtful whether Turkey, despite her new strategic railways, could ever throw more than 400,000 men on European soil, and even these might be of questionable value.



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