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# TACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR SQUAD LEADERS



1982

Published for Instructional Purposes Only

**EDUCATION CENTER  
MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134**

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
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FOREWORD

The contents of this IP are designed to reawaken an interest in history and the study of tactics. Too often we get caught up in the mundane affairs of life and neglect our professional obligation to improve our competence in fighting battles. Tragically, the day to day management of the myriad administrative and management tasks associated with commanding and leading tactical units leave too little time for study and reflection on the very purpose of our existence as Marines i.e., to train, fight and win battles. Each and every one of us from fire team leader through division commander has a moral and professional obligation to continuously upgrade and add to our war fighting skills. The ultimate in being a Marine is leading other Marines in battle. Therefore our moral obligation is to lead them well and win! The study and analysis of how the warriors before us functioned in combat gives us priceless insight, knowledge and benefit of their experience. Nothing teaches better than experience. The historical scenarios enclosed within have been carefully selected to correspond to your level of leadership and experience. They require no equipment, little time for preparation and can be used in the barracks, at the club, or during dead-time in the field as you await the next evolution of training. Your training aids are as simple as a piece of chalk and blackboard, or a stick and sand or dirt to develop and depict the terrain and situation. This IP is certainly not the total answer to improving our tactical skills, but it provides an excellent and an interesting approach in that direction.

*D. M. Twomey*  
D. M. TWOMEY  
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps  
Director

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# TACTICAL PROBLEMS FOR SQUAD LEADERS

## SECTION 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 101. GENERAL

This handout presents, for instructional purposes, a selection of tactical scenarios requiring analysis and decision on the part of Marine Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) at the squad and platoon level. "Tactical Problems" is presented as a vehicle for development of the tactical skills necessary to win battles and so is directed primarily at the combat arms. Readers should keep in mind, however, that any Marine Corps unit may suddenly find itself involved in combat - even units that traditionally are considered rear echelon units. These tactical problems can therefore be used by any unit in the Marine Corps as a training tool.

#### 102. BACKGROUND

A training package called What Now, Lt? was developed at the 9th Infantry Division (USA) to prepare the division's company level leaders for combat. The original concept was developed by the Division Commander, MG H. F. STONE, to present junior leaders with tactical problems and require them to solve those problems. Grateful acknowledgement is made to the personnel of the Battle Simulation Center, Ft. Lewis, Washington as the source of some of the original material contained in this text. The Education Center, MCDEC, has undertaken this expansion of the original training package with the conviction that it has valuable potential as a training vehicle with Marine Corps-wide application.

#### 103. APPLICABILITY

This publication is not directive in nature and no attempt is made to develop doctrine. The tactical problems presented are drawn straight from historical examples and no comment is made on the validity of the historical solutions. Readers are left free to draw their own conclusions.

#### 104. INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

One of the scenarios is depicted on a sand table around which the Marines are gathered. A discussion leader reads the scenario to the group and calls upon one Marine to make a decision. All scenarios are written from historical accounts of small unit actions in both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Israeli Wars. When the selected individual has made his decision, the real battle begins because at that point, the discussion leader throws it open to the floor for other opinions. Since every individual has his own perceptions and opinions, a lively debate usually results. Every participant gets instant feedback on the pros and cons of his decision. When the discussion leader feels that no further learning will result from the discussion, he presents the historical solution made by the actual leader on the spot. That solution is not the "right" one because in some cases, that decision led to the destruction of the leader's force or failure to accomplish his mission. The historical solution is merely an account of what really happened and is a vehicle for further discussion.

## 105. OBJECTIVES

a. "Tactical Problems" confront Marine leaders with problems they may face in combat. Since the great majority of Marines serving today have never been to war and have at best a scanty knowledge of what they are likely to encounter, "Tactical Problems" can give some foresight of what may happen. It should be stressed that these scenarios are not fictional; they were actually faced by an earlier soldier.

b. A second objective is to stimulate professional interest among Marines in warfare. Actual combat experiences of earlier leaders may awaken a desire in the participants to know more about what took place; leading them into a trip to the library and the beginnings of professional study. The source of each problem is listed at the head of the scenario for reference.

c. The key objective of the exercise is to generate thought upon tactical problems. There is absolutely no intent to imply that the same tactical problem will occur in some future war that requires the same solution. The only intent is to develop reason. There are no "school solutions" and no Marine should come away believing that problem "A" calls for solution "B" in all cases. Also, "Tactical Problems" is not designed as a tool by which a company commander, for example, may teach his NCOs the exact course of action he wishes them to pursue in a particular situation. The tactical possibilities of any given situation will be unique to that situation and realistically, the junior leader on the spot will make his own decision based on his own perceptions and experience. "Tactical Problems" is used to develop a rational thought process for solving a tactical situation and commanders can get their best results by guiding their junior leaders in the development of this thought process.

d. A final objective is the development of creativity. The participants are encouraged to express any solution to the tactical problem which they feel might work. As a result, extremely innovative solutions often emerge.

## 106. ROLE OF THE DISCUSSION LEADER

a. The discussion leader is all important in using "Tactical Problems". It falls upon his shoulders to generate thought. Until the other participants begin to do so, he must second guess every decision and point out problems that the Marine expressing a decision failed to consider. He must also force the players to express their intentions in detail. Each step must be dissected to determine exactly what the leader will do. Do not settle for generalities! It is not enough to claim that one would order his machineguns to open fire. He must determine how he is going to get those machineguns to open up in the midst of a noisy fire fight when his radio is shattered and there are fifty meters of open ground swept by fire between himself and his guns.

b. The best discussion leaders are Marines with more experience than the participants. For example, the company first sergeant might be just the man to do a great job with platoon sergeants or squad leaders. There are many senior NCOs in the Marine Corps with valuable combat experience, and utilizing these individuals as discussion leaders is an excellent means of drawing on their knowledge.

c. Whenever possible, the discussion leader should try to keep each group of participants of similar grade or experience. The free expression of opinions and the heated arguments which generate so much enthusiasm usually flow best in such an environment. He must maintain the understanding that there are no right and wrong answers, while at the same time encouraging the participants to speak freely.

d. There is no intent to limit Marines to a particular set of "Tactical Problems" scenarios. If a discussion leader desires, he may introduce problems from a higher or lower leadership echelon. For example, a company gunny may use the company grade problems in a discussion with platoon sergeants to generate thought on how they would handle the situation if their platoon leader was taken out of action.

## 107. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The "Tactical Problems" series is continually expanding, which generates a constant need for new materials. Supplements will be published regularly and holed for easy collection in binders. Individuals are encouraged to develop new scenarios and forward them to the address given below so that all Marines may benefit from their contribution. New scenarios should include:

- (1) A description of the general situation (friendly and enemy).
- (2) A sketch map of the area.
- (3) The specific situation requiring a solution.
- (4) The historical solution and exact reference where it was found.

b. Recommendations for improving this publication are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals.

Editor  
MCDEC Operational Overview  
Amphibious Instruction Department  
Education Center, MCDEC  
Quantico, Va. 22134

## 108. SOURCES

At the head of each scenario, the source from which the material was adapted is listed along with the name and organization of the individual developing the scenario. For easy reference, the sources are given in a combined list below:

- (1) Pork Chop Hill, by S. L. A. Marshall (Pub. William Morrow and Co.)
- (2) Small Unit Actions (Pubs. U. S. War Dept. Historical Division 1946)
- (3) Combat Actions in Korea, by Russell A. Gugelor (Pub. Office of Chief of Military History, U. S. Army)
- (4) Scorched Earth: The Russian-German War 1943-1944, by Paul Carell (Pub. Little, Brown and Co.)

TACTICAL PROBLEMS  
FOR  
SQUAD LEADERS

SECTION II  
SCENARIOS




SCENARIO 1

FROM: S.L.A. Marshall's Pork Chop Hill  
Capt Williams  
Battle Simulation Ctr  
9th Div (USA)

THE INCREDIBLE PATROL

SITUATION 1: Your battalion is occupying defensive positions on a ridgeline. Jutting down from that ridgeline are two fingers on which your company has prepared two fortified positions called Aunt and Uncle. Below those fingers is a valley through which runs an irrigation ditch. About 200 meters in front of that irrigation ditch lies the intersection of three trails.



You are leading 15 men, with two M60 machineguns, on a combat patrol forward of your company's positions. Your only indirect fire support is the 81mm mortar platoon. The numbers on the board represent pre-planned targets for that platoon. Your mission is to ambush an enemy patrol and return with prisoners. It is nearly midnight. You select a

position behind the irrigation ditch overlooking the intersection of the trails. You are no sooner in position when an enemy soldier appears 300 meters to your front. He is quickly joined by more and more enemy forces until approximately a company has been assembled at that location. You try to call your company, but the radio will not break through. As the enemy company forms to your front, you spot another company about 500 meters to your left moving towards one of the fortified knobs your company defends (Aunt), and still another company moving towards Uncle on your right. In other words, you are in the middle of a battalion attack of two columns attacking Aunt and Uncle, connected by a reserve company in the center. By the time you have fooled with your radio for a while, one column is at the foot of Aunt and the other has crossed the irrigation ditch approaching Uncle. The enemy to your front is about 200 meters away and moving slowly towards your position. However, you have a well concealed route of withdrawal available to your rear. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** The patrol leader crawled from man to man cautioning everyone to be silent and to hold fire until he opened up. He also tried his radio from different spots among his men to see if he could break through from another location. He made no attempt to send back messengers or retreat, presumably because the enemy was already behind him.

**SITUATION 2:** Still unable to cut through with your radio, you see that the enemy point is within 10 meters of your patrol's position. The company on your left is climbing the finger towards Aunt while the third company is approaching the finger of Uncle. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** The patrol opened up with everything they had. The enemy point element was cut down immediately, but the rest of the company hit the dirt and began returning fire.

**SITUATION 3:** Your patrol is under heavy fire from the company to your front. Finally, you are able to break through on the radio. The battalion S-3 answers your call. What do you tell him?

**HISTORICALLY:** The patrol leader said that he was surrounded, had killed some of the enemy, and wanted mortar fires on AA1. In other words, he ignored the threat to his immediate front, hoping to shatter the columns moving on Aunt.

**SITUATION 4:** Skirmishers from the company you have just engaged begin moving on your left flank. Illumination rounds landing over AA1 reveal that the mortars are killing some of the forces moving on Aunt. However, they also reveal enemy figures swarming amidst the positions at Aunt. You report that the enemy is in Aunt's position and request VT directly on Aunt. Enemy artillery is now falling on the two fortified outposts and on the battalion's positions along the ridgeline. However, American mortar fire has, in your opinion, shattered the forces not yet in Aunt's position. You realize that you are probably the only man in your battalion who can see the whole picture of the battle. You alone know of the massed attacks on both outposts. However, you also realize that due to the slope of the fingers (which point towards your patrol's position) your location is the likely spot where the enemy battalion will converge if they fall in their attacks. You see the second enemy company in a draw just below Uncle, obviously massing for the attack. The company to your front has moved soldiers onto your left flank and is closing in on you. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** The patrol leader shifted some of his men to the left to thwart the flanking movement. Then he shifted the mortar fire to AA8, right on top of the company massing to hit Uncle.

**SITUATION 5:** The enemy has shifted over 90 degrees and is on your left flank and rear. Stragglers from Aunt and Uncle are streaming back towards your location and join the attack on your patrol. You have about 30 rounds of ammunition remaining in the entire patrol. What do you do?


**HISTORICALLY:** Patrol leader called for fires on AA5. When he ran out of ammunition, he simply kept up the fires all around his patrol's location, gradually closing the ring. For two hours, the patrol remained in position without ammunition, calling in mortars on every attack against them.

**SITUATION 6:** You have no ammunition remaining. Daylight has arrived. There are no signs of live enemy left in the area, but your patrol has been in combat for seven hours. Battalion orders you to search the battlefield, examine the dead bodies for documents, and capture any wounded. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** Believe it or not, the patrol leader led his men about the battlefield for three hours, carrying out his latest orders, without ammunition, before he returned to his company's position. The patrol leader was a young Ethiopian lieutenant who had arrived in Korea only 3 days before he received this mission.







## SCENARIO 2

FROM: S.L.A. Marshall's Pork Chop Hill  
CPT Williams  
Battle Simulation Ctr  
9th Div (USA)

### AMBUSHERS AMBUSHED


SITUATION 1: You are a patrol leader on your first combat mission of the war. Your task is to set up an ambush along a drainage ditch about 1500 meters in front of your company's position. Your ambush position cannot be supported by direct fire weapons from friendly lines, but you do have mortar and artillery support. There are 24 men in your patrol divided into two groups: the assault group, led by you (a SSgt), and the support group, led by a corporal. The two groups are about 100 meters apart. It is a dark night and your patrol is to stay in position from 1000 to 0200. The fighting has been quiet in this sector and you expect no action. You have been in position for 4 hours. Although your men are still awake, they are rather unalert; their senses dulled by the quiet night and the expectation that the enemy is not around.

You are on the horn, telling your commander that you are returning to base, when suddenly the enemy opens fire on your assault element from both flanks. Your position is crisscrossed with rifle fire, but nobody is hit in the first fires because the enemy is firing high. You scream into your TA-312 to get fire from the support group, but cannot raise them because your Ratello, while diving for cover in the hail of bullets, ripped the wire from the phone. The radio is with your F.O. who is 75 meters from your location. Unfortunately, he is the only man in the force hit by the enemy fire. At the same time, the support element is illuminated for all the world to see by a misplaced mortar flare called by a neighboring company. They are perfectly silhouetted against the sky by that light and are under effective enemy fire. The unexpected light has destroyed your visual purple and, as it disappears, you are blind. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: The patrol leader kept calling uselessly into his phone for help, while everyone else hugged the earth. Most soldiers did not return fire. The enemy did not close on either position because they were afraid of American firepower. One or two eventually charged. One NCO started to recover enough vision to "sense" someone approaching him and fired point blank into the enemy's face, then past him into another soldier. Nevertheless, there was very little fire from the US patrol.

SITUATION 2: Instead of providing you with supporting fires, the beleaguered support group panics, abandons their position, and rushes toward your location with the assault group. The enemy forces are also struggling with the effects of the blinding light and their fire slackens momentarily. At last, the soldiers with you in the assault group begin to use their weapons. Just then, you see soldiers running toward you calling your name and yelling "Don't shoot! Don't shoot! We're coming in." You recognize elements of your support group running right over top of the enemy who had been attacking you. But at the same time, you see several of the enemy soldiers leap up and follow the Marines into your ambush site, throwing grenades over their heads into your lines. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: The patrol leader yelled to hold fire. His soldiers obeyed, but the Chinese kept firing and throwing grenades. The Americans frantically thrust aside grenades and finally two soldiers fired at anyone without a helmet, killing several. The action of those two soldiers saved everyone's life because it stopped the only Chinese who had taken action.



SITUATION 3: You are badly wounded by grenade fragments in one leg, momentarily unconscious, and thought to be dead by your soldiers. In the seconds that you were passed out, your patrol has grabbed the wounded and begun a fighting withdrawal towards friendly front lines. You do not know how you got there, but when you regain consciousness, you are crawling uphill. You crawl until you hit some wire which you recognize as a portion of the company's defense. You cross back into friendly lines and learn that your patrol has not yet returned. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Another lieutenant organized a relief patrol and went to give support to any patrol members still in the valley.

SITUATION 4: You have organized a ten man relief patrol and are leading it back to the ambush site to give support. You encounter the remnants of your patrol struggling up the hill carrying the wounded, but they have left the dead behind. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader left the relief patrol at that spot to protect the wounded patrol and went alone with a medic to certify that the soldiers left behind were really dead.

SITUATION 5: Setting up your relief patrol to provide cover, you and your medic go down to the dead bodies to see if they are actually dead. They are all dead. At that point four to five enemy soldiers attack; you kill several. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader led patrol back to the company perimeter as he did not want to risk more lives removing dead bodies. The bodies were picked up in the morning with a fresh patrol.






SCENARIO 3

FROM: S.L.A. Marshall's Pork Chop Hill  
 CPT Williams  
 Battle Simulation Ctr  
 9th Div (USA)

THE PATROL TO THE VALLEY

SITUATION 1: You are the leader of a ten man patrol operating on rocky, lightly vegetated terrain. Your company occupies a defensive position on a finger jutting from a ridgeline, along which your battalion is located.



It is nighttime and visibility is poor. Your mission is to move from your company position down the finger to a valley below, ambush any enemy forces and attempt to capture prisoners. You have your company mortars and the 81mm mortar platoon available to you. You position your patrol so that a five man assault team is on the valley floor and a five man support force is on slightly higher ground. The teams are close enough to provide mutual support. However, in the darkness, they cannot see each other. You are with the assault team. After being in position for several hours, you spot a force of about 50 light infantry enemy soldiers moving towards you. At the same time, silhouetted against the evening sky, you can see enemy forces swarming over the high ground to your right and left. The enemy is obviously making a full scale attack upon your company's position. You try to call your company, but the radio cannot raise them. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: In real life, the assault team fired at the 50 Chinese and attempted to fall back on the support element and return to the company perimeter. The support team, seeing the enemy all around them, attempted to link up with their patrol leader and return to the company. The teams missed each other in the dark.

SITUATION 2: While moving uphill towards your support element, you and the assault team are caught in heavy mortar fire from your own battalion's mortars. You order everyone to race to a cluster of boulders about 100 meters to your front. Once there, you find that two men are missing. The enemy can be seen in great numbers on the high ground all around you, but you still cannot talk to anyone on the radio. After waiting awhile, you hear the groans of the two missing men. You investigate and find them alive, but they are unable to move. The mortar fire is now coming in heavier than before; most of it from your own 81 platoon. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader ordered his men into a shell hole and had them dig it as deep as they could while he attempted to carry the wounded men to the hole. One of the wounded died in the attempt.

SITUATION 3: You attempt to make it back to friendly front lines. However, of your ten man patrol, five are still missing, one man is dead and another is unconscious. In the retreat up the hill, more mortar fires land in your group. The unconscious man is killed and a second man has his legs shattered so that he cannot walk. Although conscious, he gives up and pleads with you to kill him. The other man with you is now a bundle of nerves and is urging the two of you to make a break for it. At that moment, eight enemy aid men, carrying stretchers and kit bags, come out of the dark towards your location. They have not yet seen you. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader fired on the enemy soldiers and scattered them. Then he and the other man picked up the badly wounded man and continued heading towards friendly lines. The patrol leader attempted to convince the man with the shattered leg to keep fighting for his life. Eventually, the three of them made it back to their company, which had successfully fought off the Chinese attack. One man from the support team also made it back.



#### SCENARIO 4

FROM: Combat Actions in Korea  
Chapter 3  
CPT Williams  
Battle Simulation Ctr  
9th Div (USA)

#### DEFEND THE GUNS


SITUATION 1: You are the first sergeant of a battery of 105's in direct support of an infantry battalion. Your battery is part of a MAU which has been rushed to Korea in response to a North Korean invasion of the south. The powerful enemy drive has blasted through the South Koreans and the U.S. 2nd and 82nd Divisions which were first on the scene. Your MAU reinforces the battered 2nd Division on the new defensive line. You move into a position within a shallow bowl formed by a low ridge. A railroad track runs through the front edge of that bowl and since the bowl is too small to accommodate all your guns, you place one gun to the north edge of the tracks. Your FDC is dug in on the south side of the tracks but your signal personnel and your headquarters men are setup in several Korean houses north of the tracks. Due to North Korean infiltrators, you have kept your battery as close together as possible and have set up ten defensive positions around your guns, including four 50 cal's and three M60 machine guns. In addition, 2 quad 50's are in your sector, but they are not assigned to your commander. There are several American infantry companies (USMC & Army) scattered around the area, but you have not coordinated with them and you have had little contact with their soldiers. Your battery is alert and firing a mission in support of the infantry around 0230 one night. You are checking your positions and have reached the communication people when you see three figures walking down the road dragging something. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: The 1stSGT asked "Who's there?" When he got no response, he ordered the figures to halt. They continued walking. Then they pulled the thing they were dragging into a position along the road. The dragged object proved to be a heavy machine gun and the three figures were North Koreans. They opened fire on the battery and killed several people immediately.

SITUATION 2: You see the three figures on the road open fire with a heavy machine gun. At the same time, three machinegun's on the ridge open fire on the gunners in their pits and still another heavy machine gun opens up from the town of Saga. A North Korean soldier suddenly appears beside you and empties an AK47 into your communication sergeant and NBC NCO who are standing a few feet in front of you. The Korean then throws a grenade into the hut and disappears behind the building. You race towards the guns and run into one of the 50 cal positions, but it is manned by only one man. As you reach him, a North Korean team comes within 30 meters of you and begins to set up their machinegun pointing at you. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Tried to fire the machinegun, but the gun failed to function. The sergeant (actually this situation happened to another NCO) ran across the rice paddies in the direction of an American Infantry company where he had seen a tank earlier in the day. He eventually returned with help.

SITUATION 3: You run to the mess tent to organize a force to protect the CP. You find four men in the building and order them to grab their weapons and set up in a perimeter to the north and east of the CP. They rush out the door and right in the middle of 15-20 North Koreans mingling around. The lead man is shot and you pull him back into the building. What do you do?



**HISTORICALLY:** This actually happened to several PFC's. They pulled the wounded man back into the building and tried to get out another door but ran into more North Koreans. They hid in the corner of the room. They did not prepare hasty positions or make any other effort to escape or fight.


**SITUATION 4:** All of the above action occurred in the first 4 or 5 minutes of the fight. But you know that already your communication section is either dead or cut off and that the mission has been stopped as your crews lie in cover in the gun pits. Tracer rounds from Saga and the ridgeline crisscross over your gun positions. With the enemy already inside your defensive perimeter, you know that all the firepower positioned around your guns is

useless since friendly machine gun fire would probably now hit friendly troops. Battalion is on the radio wanting to know why the mission has been stopped. Cries for corpsmen ring out from the gun positions. Suddenly there is a flash and explosion; gun #5's ammunition pile has been hit! From the blaze of its light, you can see North Koreans rushing towards your guns. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** This actually happened to the battery XO, who ran to gun #3 and had them lower their tubes and fire against the ridgeline. He also figured that the crew of gun #5 must be dead or gone, so he fired on that position. The two howitzers fired about 18 rounds against the ridge and the gunners on #3 fired their small arms and grenades at #5 for 10 minutes. Then the XO ordered the crew to fall back to the gully by the tracks. Supporting fire was given by the two soldiers who crawled behind a 50 cal and poured 1300 rounds into the North Koreans. The battery commander attempted to make certain that all his people were out of the gun pits by rushing from gun to gun.

**SITUATION 5:** The battery has regrouped in the gully beside the tracks. The corpsmen are working feverishly to handle the wounded. The enemy is reluctant to attack this stronghold and fire slackens. You have battalion on the phone. What do you tell them?

**HISTORICALLY:** Called for fire on the ridgeline and on the hill in front of the guns. The fires were right on target. Then the tank which one of the soldiers had run to get came rolling up. The tank helped chase off the North Koreans, but scattered rifle fire continued until daylight when the enemy retreated and the battery could return to its guns. Seven men were dead and 12 wounded. The guns were undamaged and the battery continued its mission.




HILL 103

**SITUATION 1:** You are a squad leader in charge of 11 Marines. For the last month, your unit has been fighting in hilly terrain against a skillful enemy that shows no sign of giving up, even though he has been pushed steadily back. Finally, the enemy has made a stand in fairly strong positions astride a ridge. Because the fighting has been fairly heavy and the battalion commander does not want to risk heavy casualties, he decides to mount a night attack to achieve surprise. You receive your 5 paragraph order in the afternoon which details your part. H-Hour is set for 2300.

At first, all goes well. Your company moves in platoon columns to its attack position without much problem and deploys for the attack. Your platoon is going to guide on a road 25 meters off on the right. Your squad is on the right, another squad is to your left and the remainder of the platoon is to your rear. Prep fires have been working over the enemy positions and as soon as those fires shift to the rear, the platoon leader gives the word to move out.

Almost immediately, you discover that it is much more difficult to maintain direction while in a tactical formation than it was to move in column earlier. (There is no moon and it is pitch dark.) Moving up a small slope, you rapidly lose contact with the rest of the platoon, which moves off into the night without you.

You decide to push on in hopes of catching up to the rest of the platoon somewhere ahead. Your squad walks fast up the forward slopes of Hill 103 under cover of an ascending row of terraces, which protect you from the machineguns known to be on the crest of the hill. Indiscriminate mortar fire begins falling all around you on the way up. Finally, you reach the highest terrace on the slope which is the last line of protective cover against machinegun fire. You lead the squad into a large shell hole, set up a hasty defense and assess the situation. There are enemy machineguns firing from two dugouts on the crest of the hill. Though you're not too sure they are firing at you, they are only 35 yards away and their line of fire is even with the top of the terrace you're on - so firing rifles over the terrace doesn't seem like a good idea to you. Also, there is concertina wire strung along the top of the terrace. To make the night complete, you now discover your radio does not work. There is absolutely no sign of any of the rest of the platoon. What do you do?




**HISTORICALLY:** This action took place in Italy during May, 1944. The 11 men in the shell crater were actually led by a lieutenant. First they tried throwing grenades at the dugouts, but this had no effect. Leaving a few men in the crater, the Lt. led the rest over the terrace towards the machineguns. Clearing the barbed wire without injury, they crawled forward under heavy machinegun and mortar fire until they reached an open trench into which they dropped for protection.

**SITUATION 2:** You are slightly behind the two enemy machineguns now. The trench you are in connects the machinegun dugouts with sleeping quarters and other enemy positions on the reverse slope of Hill 103; it is 30-50 yards long and 5-6 feet deep, but is barely wide enough for one man to wiggle through. The south end of the trench 'Ts' into another trench connecting the two machinegun dugouts. This connecting trench is covered, but you don't know if there are enemy soldiers in it. You are protected from machinegun fire so long as you keep your heads down. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** The Americans once again threw grenades at the machinegun positions. They threw every grenade they had without doing any damage at all to the enemy. At this point, American mortar fire began to land all around them, and the Lt. left the trench and crawled to another shell hole near the road. There he saw a dozen men dash across the road, but he couldn't tell if they were friendly or enemy. When they threw a grenade at him, his doubts were resolved and he beat a hasty retreat back to the communications trench.

**SITUATION 3:** Your radio still is not working. You receive word that the fire team leader you left in charge down below on the terrace has been shot; additionally, you are surrounded. As if arranged to confirm this, an enemy soldier pops up and shoots the rifle out of one man's hands and damages your own weapon. You decide that you are indeed surrounded. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** The Lt. decided to run for it, so he led his group back over the edge of the terrace where he rejoined the group that had remained in the first crater. In the rush, two men got left behind in the communication trench on top of Hill 103. He decided to wait for them and set up a hasty defense, but when mortar fire killed two men he decided to pull out. He sent all survivors back to the rear and stayed behind with an NCO for 15 more minutes, hoping the two missing men would make it back to his position. At the end of 15 minutes, he gave them up for dead and returned to the rear. He and his men returned safely, but took no further part in the battle. The two missing men - both wounded - later returned unassisted to the battalion's lines.






SCENARIO 6

FROM: Paul Carell's Scorched Earth:  
The Russian-German War, 1943-  
1944  
CWO2 Lavender  
Amphibious Instruction Dept  
MCDEC

SERGEANT NEFEDOV'S BRIDGEHEAD

SITUATION 1: You are an infantry platoon sergeant. Your battalion is making a night assault in rubber boats across a defended riverline. The attack was supposed to be a surprise but the enemy discovers your movement before you are even halfway across the (600 yards wide) river. Flares light up the night and direct fire weapons are brought to bear. Boat after boat sinks. Finally, your platoon reaches the riverbank and you take stock. You have 20 men armed with: 13 M16s, two M203s, one M60 machinegun and one .50 cal machinegun from the heavy weapons platoon. You also have a radio, but you can not raise anyone who can tell you anything that seems to make sense. Behind you, you cannot see any friendly forces - the attack seems to have been stopped cold. You are on a low riverbank, without cover, and you are sure that when the sun comes up in an hour, the enemy on the 100-foot high bank 200 yards away will see you and cut you to pieces. You're just as sure that if you take your boats and try to recross the river, you'll be seen and quickly blown away. What do you do?





**HISTORICALLY:** This situation happened to a Russian NCO, Sgt Nefedov, in September 1943 when the Soviet Army was trying to force crossings over the Dnieper River. Sgt Nefedov quietly led his small platoon right up under the noses of the German defenders on the high bank and dug in. The Germans discovered his position and made platoon and company-strength counterattacks throughout the day. Sgt Nefedov was down to ten men at the end of the day, but was reinforced during the night. Sgt Nefedov's bridgehead was eventually expanded to a multi-corps strategic bridgehead and was the starting point for a Soviet offensive that liberated Kiev.



## SCENARIO 7

FROM: S.L.A. Marshall's Pork Chop Hill  
CWO2 Lavender  
Amphibious Instruction Dept  
MCDEC

### "KEEP A SHARP LOOKOUT"


**SITUATION 1:** You have been given the mission to conduct an ambush patrol and attempt to capture a prisoner. The patrol of ten Marines was put together from several different units, but as a sergeant of Marines, you feel confident that you can handle the assignment.

A rehearsal was planned for 1600, but enemy mortar fire prevented that and you were not able to gather the entire patrol until dark. A quick brief is all you have time for before you move out at 2000. The patrol is organized into an assault team and a support team of five men each; you are with the assault team. For communication, you have a TA-312 land line. Weapons include: two M60s, one M203, and seven M16s. All hands have six hand grenades.

The passage through friendly lines is uneventful and you push rapidly down to the ambush site. The assault group is in position at 2115. Though you have not physically seen the support group behind you, you assume it is in position 200 meters to the rear of the assault group.

Using the land line, you report to the company CP that the patrol is in position, but are taken aback when the XO tells you "Keep a sharp lookout. We are expecting a main attack." What's this? Why weren't you told? Your orders remain the same, though - an ambush patrol, POWs desired.

At 2230, you spot about 50 enemy troops coming down the slope of the hill in front of the patrol's position. They are well spread out on line and heading right for you. What do you do?



HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader sent one man forward to scout the enemy line and sat tight. He did not inform the company CP of the situation.

SITUATION 2: Your point man is back in less than 1 minute. He says, "They're all around us! They cover the slope! For Christ's sake, do something!" What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader still did not inform CP of the situation. Instead, he took two men forward and threw grenades at the Chinese when they were 20 yards away. Only then did he try to call the CP. But he had forgotten that in setting in the ambush he had explored the ground to the front while carrying the phone. The land line was looped through rocks in front of him and he cut it with his own grenades. He quickly tried the radio but it wasn't working.

SITUATION 3: The enemy line in front of you has melted into the dark. You have no communication with the CP. The support group is not where it is supposed to be. There are apparently hundreds of enemy soldiers climbing the slopes of the hill around you, though so far, they don't seem to know where you are. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader waited 15 minutes, then tried to climb back up the hill to friendly lines. They only got 40 yards before friendly artillery and mortars laid down fire all across the front between them and the company. They took shelter, but still lost one man to this fire. The sergeant in charge never did find his support group, but succeeded in bringing out the assault group many hours later.


This patrol fired the first shots in the Battle of Pork Chop Hill. The sergeant had just walked in off R and R when he was put in charge, and so was unable to participate in the rehearsals held the day prior, which were supposed to give organizational unity to men from two different companies - a serious error. The 31st Regiment had been told to expect a major attack that evening, but having doubts about the reliability of the information, decided to send out the scheduled patrol anyway. The NCOIC (as indicated above) received not one hint of this expected attack until he was deep in no man's land.

## SCENARIO 8

FROM: Russell A. Gugeler's  
Combat Actions in Korea  
CWO2 Lavender  
Amphibious Instruction Dept  
MCDEC

### PATROL TO NONAME RIDGE

SITUATION 1: You have been assigned the mission to conduct a combat patrol to Noname Ridge to kill or capture any enemy encountered. You will take two reinforced rifle squads out on this patrol the night of 3 April. It is now the afternoon of 2 April. Information on the enemy is sketchy; all that is known for sure is that they are digging trenches and bunkers on Noname Ridge. What do you do?



HISTORICALLY: (Discussion should cover all steps taken in preparation for a patrol.) The patrol leader selected the squads going, reinforced them with other men from the same platoon, prepared his patrol order, and prepared a sand table model. The next day he took the entire patrol up to a point where they could see the planned route and issued his order. Details were discussed over the sand table model.


The patrol was divided into an assault squad of eight men plus the patrol leader, and a support squad of the 11 other men. Communications were provided by two field radios and a field phone with two spools of slash wire. The communication was tied in to an OP on the front lines which would be manned by the company commander and FOs. There was direct communication from the OP to the Battalion CP by both phone and radio.

SITUATION 2: You feel confident that you have covered every detail as you lead the patrol out at 2100. You reach the objective area a little after midnight with no contact. Instructions from the rear are continuing on: "Get a prisoner if you can. If you can't, shoot 'em up. Decide on the route you are going to take to make contact, move forward a hundred yards, then report again." The move forward is made without incident, then a second move of another hundred yards. You are now only 150 yards from the top of the ridge. Now you see a group of enemy soldiers coming down from the enemy's main defenses towards Noname Ridge. They are on the other side of where you think the trenchline is. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader called artillery fire on the enemy group.


SITUATION 3: The artillery fire you requested landed right where the enemy troops were sighted. Your patrol has now made contact of sorts, but hasn't captured a prisoner. The enemy may be suspicious as to how such accurate artillery fire is being called in on them and may decide to patrol forward of their lines. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader cautiously led the patrol another 100 yards up the ridge and stopped.



SITUATION 4: You are now only 50 yards from the very top of the ridge. You can see a very large bunker a little to the left and smaller bunkers on both sides. The position is definitely occupied by a large number of enemy troops. You can hear them talking, laughing, and the clink of mess gear tells you that a late meal is in progress. What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Patrol leader formed the patrol for assault.



(Discussion should include assault formation and disposition of weapons in the formation. Assume two M60 machineguns w/tripods, two more M60 machineguns w/o tripods, two M203s, and all others M16s.)

SITUATION 5: Your assault group is moving slowly up the slope now. You are only 25 yards from the enemy trench when one of your men trips a booby trap. The concussion grenade throws him to the ground and every other man hits the ground almost as fast. Should you assume surprise is lost? Should you assault immediately or withdraw? What do you do?

HISTORICALLY: Nothing happened. The American patrol lay quietly for several minutes, but the N. Koreans apparently ignored the noise and continued to chatter away. The assault group then moved on up. The man who tripped the grenade was unhurt.


The assault group got into the enemy trenches, had a prolonged firefight and successfully withdrew. The observers at the OP were able to cover the withdrawal of the patrol with artillery and mortar fire even though communication was lost early in the action. All members of the patrol returned, with only one seriously wounded.





POINT - BLANK

SITUATION 1: Your ambush patrol has been in position for 6 hours now on a pitch black night. Your reinforced squad is arranged as shown below:



When you laid out the positions, it was with the expectation that the assault group would make the first contact, probably against enemy troops climbing up the knoll on some small trails. The support groups were placed to engage withdrawing enemy forces. All elements are tied to your position by land-line and you have both land-line and radio communication to higher headquarters. At 0300, the corporal in charge crawls up to your position and hand signals that at least one enemy soldier is approaching the support group. This is not the way you planned it. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** The patrol leader alerted the assault group by sending a runner rather than risk using the phone. The alert was carried out noiselessly and soon all weapons were trained in the direction of the enemy. Then he waited.

**SITUATION 2:** The NCO from the support group returns and signals that more enemy troops have been sighted. You think this may be a good opportunity to take a prisoner. What do you do?

**HISTORICALLY:** Patrol leader sent one man out on the left to throw a single grenade at the enemy, figuring this would be enough to stun them and enable the support group to bag the lot.

**SITUATION 3:** The grenade goes off, but in the brief flash reveals a dangerous situation. There are at least 20 enemy troops out there, the grenade didn't hurt them, they are deployed and lying flat with all their weapons aimed straight at your left support group. For a brief instant everything is silent, then the enemy line opens fire on the left support group. The support group begins blasting away, but the odds are uneven to say the least -- five-to-one.

